Wilson v. E. H. Clement Co.

Beogden, J. Is the claimant entitled to receive compensation for the injury sustained on or about 15 August, 1929? C. S., 8081 (dd), 8081 (ee), and 8081 (ff), prescribe the method of giving notice and of filing a claim with the Industrial Commission. C. S., 8081 (ff), declares in plain and unequivocal language that “the right to compensation . . . shall be forever barred unless the claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within one year after the accident,” etc. It was found as a fact by the Industrial Commission that no *543 claim was filed by anyone witbin a year from tbe date of tbe accident, and, consequently, nothing else appearing, plaintiff would not be entitled to recover. However, tbe plaintiff asserts tbat C. S., 8081 (ff), is a statute of limitations, and tbat tbe same bas been waived by tbe defendants, or tbat by tbeir conduct tbey lulled tbe plaintiff to sleep, and while be slept deprived him of bis right of compensation, and therefore tbe principle of equitable estoppel prevents them from asserting tbe bar of tbe statute. Tbe defendants assert with equal conviction tbat tbe statute is not a statute of limitations, but a condition precedent annexed to tbe cause of action, and cannot be waived by tbe parties. Tbe defendants further assert tbat, even if it be conceded tbat tbe principle of equitable estoppel would be applicable, there is no evidence in tbe record sufficient to invoke such doctrine. It is unnecessary to decide whether C. S., 8081 (ff), is a condition precedent or a statute of limitations. Of course, if it is a condition annexed to tbe cause of action of similar character to C. S., 160, obviously tbe claimant was entitled to no compensation. Conceding, but not deciding, tbat tbe statute is one of limitations, is there any evidence upon which to base tbe doctrine of equitable estoppel? Tbe nature of such estoppel and tbe elements thereof, as heretofore declared and applied, were stated in Franklin v. Franks, 205 N. C., 96. Tbe Court said:. “Tbe general rule is tbat a party may either by agreement or conduct estop himself from pleading tbe statute of limitations as a defense to an obligation. ... To constitute such estoppel, there must be more than a mere delay or indulgence at tbe request of tbe debtor. There must be an express agreement not to plead tbe statute, or such conduct on tbe part of tbe debtor as would make it inequitable for him to do so. . . . See Lyon v. Lyon, 43 N. C., 201; Daniel v. Comrs., 74 N. C., 494; Haymore v. Comrs., 85 N. C., 268; Whitehurst v. Dey, 90 N. C., 542; Brown v. R. R., 147 N. C., 217, 60 S. E., 985. “In tbe Dey case, supra, it was intimated by tbe Court tbat it would constitute a species of fraud for a person to actively request or cause a delay in asserting a cause of action and then plead tbe statute of limitations as a defense when tbe suit was brought. Tbe Court said: No such fraudulent element is found in tbe facts of this transaction. Tbe failure to sue was not in consequence of any request from tbe defendant, nor under any agreement making payment contingent or any undetermined future event, as an underlying condition requiring delay.’ ” Tbe facts in tbe case at bar do not bring it witbin tbe principle of equitable estoppel. Tbe defendants did not request tbe claimant to delay tbe pursuit of bis rights. There was neither express nor implied *544 agreement upon their part not to plead the statute. While it is true that the defendants told the claimant that his wages were going on, nevertheless he did not receive a penny in wages for more than twelve months, and, consequently, was bound to know that no wages were being paid. The Court is of the opinion that the admitted facts are not sufficient to warrant the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel and thus to preclude the defendants from pleading the bar of C. S., 8081 (ff). Reversed.