Latimer v. . Waddell

MoNtgomeby, J. : The question in this case is, Can an estate in fee-simple be limited by a condition preventing alienation on the part of the grantee for the certain time *375 of five years ? No such limitation was recognized by or known to the common law. There cannot be a co-existence of a fee-simple estate and a total restriction upon its alienation during any peidod of time, however short it may be. One person cannot own the fee and another person the right of alienation. It is written in Littleton (Section 360), “Also, if a feoffment be made on this condition, that the feoffee shall not alien the land to any, this condition is void ; because when a man is enfeoffed of lands or tenements he hath the power to alien them to any person by law.” Coke, in commenting on that section, confirms it, and adds to the principle releases, confirmations and all other conveyances in which a fee-simple estate is passed, and also devises. Mr. Cruise (Cruise’s Digest, Title 13, Ch. 1, Sec. 22) says, “ A condition annexed to the creation of an estate in fee-simple that the tenant shall not alien is void, being repugnant to the nature of the estate, a power of alienation being an incident inseparably annexed to an estate in fee-simple.” There is not the slightest modification of this principle to be found in any of the books of the early English common law writers except in Littleton, Sec. 361, and Coke’s Commentary on that section, and in Sheppard’s Touchstone, at page 129. And the modification snggested by those writers does not permit a restraint upon alienation for a certain time, but only that it may be restrained in reference to a certain person or persons. The text of Littleton is as follows : “ But, if the condition be such that the feoffee shall not alien to such a one, naming his name, or to any of his heirs, or of the issues, if such a one, or the like, which conditions do not take away all power of alienation from the feoffee, then such condition is good. Coke, in commenting upon this section, adds to it, “ And in this case if the feoffee infeoff I. N. of entent and purpose that he shall *376 infeoff I. S., some hold that this is a breach of the condition.” In the Touchstone the modification is in these words, “ If a feoffment or other conveyance (by deed or will) be made of land, or a grant or rent in fee-simple, by deed or will, upon condition that the feoffee or grantee shall not alien to certain persons, (or shall alien to a particular person, Lit., Sec. 361,) as to J. S. or to J. S. and W. S., this is a good condition.” This modification has been extended by recent writers on the law of real estate. For example, it is said in 2 Washburn, page 448, “ There may be valid conditions restricting the free conveyance of an estate even in fee, as where the grantee is not to convey it before a certain time, or is not to convey to certain persons named.” The authorities in the note to that section, cited to sustain the author in the statement that the alienation for a certain time may be restrained, do not bear him out. He refers to Atwater v. Atwater, 18 Beav., 330, and to Tudor’s Cases, 794, and to Coke on Littleton, 223a, and to Anderson v. Cary, 36 Ohio State, 506. In all of these references, except the last one, the restrictions upon alienation were confined to certain individuals, and not in restraint of alienation for a certain time. In the last reference, that of Anderson v. Cary, the point raised was upon the right to prevent alienation for a certain time, and the decision of the court was against the position of the author. The language of the will, which gave rise to tire suit in the last-named case, was as follows: “ I give and bequeath the farm on which I now live ... to my two sons, Thomas and Lincoln, upon the following conditions: 1. I direct that they, the said sons, shall not be allowed to sell and dispose of said farm until the expiration of ten years from the time my son Charles Lincoln arrives at full age, except to one another; nor shall either of my said sons have *377 authority to mortgage or encumber said farm in any manner whatsoever, except in the sale to one another, as aforesaid.” And the court held the condition to be void. Authorities in the courts of the States of the Union on this question can be found on both sides, but if we had to decide the question upon them we would give our preference to those which declare void such conditions. But we are not left to decide between these conflicting decisions. "We think that the principle has been settled by the. adjudications of our own Court. In the case of Twitty v. Camp, Phil. Eq., 61, the question before the Court was upon a non-alienation clause in a will, which undertook to prevent the alienation by devisees in fee before they arrived at thirty-five years of age. And the Court held that the condition was contrary to the nature of the estate, and on that account void, and that the devisees had the full power to dispose of the property without incurring a forfeiture. The Court, referring to the case of Pardue v. Givens, 1 Jones Eq., 306, in which was involved the attempt to prevent the alienation of a fee-simple estate during the lives of the devisees, and which condition was held void, said: “The present case differs from that (Pardue v. Givens) only in the circumstance that here the restriction is confined to a disposition of the'land under the age of thirty-five years. But this, we think, makes no difference. If the testator had the power to impose such a condition for thirty-five years, he might have imposed it for fifty, seventy or one hundred years, for we are not aware of any particular age up to which the restriction would be good, and beyond which it would be bad. Coke and Blackstone and other elementary writers lay down the rule generally that a condition of non-alienation annexed to the conveyance inter vivos, or to a devise of a fee, is void because it is inconsistent with the full and free enjoy *378 ment which the ownership of such an estate implies.” The same principle was decided and approved in the late cases of Hardy v. Galloway, 111 N. C., 519, and Pritchard v. Bailey, 113 N. C., 521. The counsel of the plaintiff in his argument here referred us to the case of Munroe v. Hall, 97 N. C., 206, not as being directly in point, but as an indirect authority. In that case the testator, in his will, attempted the absolute restriction of all alienation. Of course, the Court held that that was void. The judge who delivered the opinion of the Court went on to say: “ The rule, however, is not so comprehensive in its operation as to prevent all conditions and restraints upon the power of alienation. Such as are limited and reasonable in their application as to the time they must operate are valid and will be upheld.” The learned judge cited as authority for this position 1 Washburn on Real Property, 67, 69, and 4 Kent Com. We have already referred to the unauthorized addition, as we think, of Washburn to the modification of the general principle, which modification allows restrictions of alienation in the conveyance of fee-simple estates, as laid down by Littleton and Coke, and Sheppard in the Touchstone, to be good when limited to a certain person or persons only. Upon a full examination of the learning on this subject in Kent’s Commentaries, it will be seen that the illustrious author does not agree even with Littleton in his modification of the general principle which prevents all restraint upon the right of alienation in fee simple estates. Pie adopts the rule without any modification. In Yolnme 4, page 126, of his Commentaries, he says : “A condition annexed to a conveyance in fee, or by devise, that the purchaser or devisee should not alien, is unlawful and void. If, however, a restraint upon alienation be confined to an individual named1, to whom the grant is not *379 to be made, it is said by very high authority (Littleton, Section 361) to be a valid condition. But this case falls within the general principle, and it may be very questionable whether such a condition would be good at this day.” This author further says, at page 5, Yolumeé: “It (afee-simple) is an estate of perpetuity and confers an unlimited power of alienation, and no person is capable of having a greater estate or interest in land. Every restraint upon alienation is inconsistent with the nature of a fee simple, and if a partial restraint be annexed to a fee as a condition not to alien for a limited time, or not to a particular person, it ceases to be a fee-simple and becomes a fee subject to a condition.” Under the common law and the decisions of our own Court we find the question presented in this case free from doubt, and we are of the opinion that the condition which undertook to restrain the tenants in fee, Alfred M. "Wad-dell, Jr., and Elizabeth S. Waddell, from aliening the property conveyed in the deed for five years from the death of the life tenant is vo d, and that they under the deed had, after the death of the life tenant, the full power of selling or otherwise disposing of the property without the danger of.incurring a forfeiture for so doing. Affirmed.