S. B. Parker Co. v. Commercial National Bank

Stacy, C. J. As the record contains no statement of case on appeal, we are limited to the question whether there is error in the judgment, the appeal itself being an exception thereto. Wallace v. Salisbury, 147 N. C., 58, 60 S. E., 713; R. R. v. Stewart, 132 N. C., 248, 43 S. E., 638; Clark v. Peebles, 120 N. C., 31, 26 S. E., 924. Conceding that under the decisions cited and relied upon by the defendants, Waters v. Garris, 188 N. C., 305, 124 S. E., 334, Miller v. *443 Dunn, 188 N. C., 397, 124 S. E., 746, and others of like import, plaintiffs would not be entitled to injunctive relief as a deliverance from alleged exaction of usury, bad the defendants not demanded a foreclosure and also an accounting, nevertheless, under the decisions in Broadhurst v. Brooks, 184 N. C., 123, 113 S. E., 576, Elliott v. Brady, 172 N. C., 828, 90 S. E., 951, and Erwin v. Morris, 137 N. C., 48, 49 S. E., 53, it would seem that they are entitled to know the correct balance due on the indebtedness secured by said deed of trust, in order to protect the interests of the receiver and judgment lienors. Riley v. Sears, 154 N. C., 509, 70 S. E., 997. In this respect, even from the viewpoint of the defendants, the judgment would seem to be well founded. And further, as the defendants have asked for affirmative relief, the authorities cited and relied upon by them would seem to be inapposite. At any rate, they are not regarded as controlling. It is the general practice of equity courts, upon a showing of a basis for injunctive relief, to continue the restraining order to the final hearing, when it appears that no harm can come to the defendants from such continuance, and great injury might result to the plaintiffs from a dissolution of the injunction. Cullins v. State College, 198 N. C., 337, 151 S. E., 646; Hurwitz v. Sand Co., 189 N. C., 1, 126 S. E., 171; Seip v. Wright, 173 N. C., 14, 91 S. E., 359. Affirmed.