Faison v. . Kelly

IToice, J., after stating the case: In Faison v. Odom, 144 N. C., 107, the Court, construing the clause of the will here in question, held that the same conferred only a life estate on the grantor of defendants, the Edward L. Faison mentioned in the will, and that, on his death, the plaintiffs, his children, could recover the land. In accordance with this ruling, the plaintiff’s recovered the land, and the question presented in this appeal is in reference to defendant’s claim to betterments. Speaking to this question, in a recent decision, Alston v. Connell, 145 N. C., 4, the Court said: “This doctrine of betterments, and the principle upon which it was originally made to rest, is very well stated by Ashe, J., in the case of Wharton v. Moore, 84 N. C., 482, as follows: ‘This right to betterments is a doctrine that has gradually grown up in the practice of the courts of equity, and while it has been adopted in many of the States, it is not recognized in others. But it may. now be considered as an established principle of equity that whenever a plaintiff seeks the aid of a court of equity to enforce his title against an innocent person who has made improvements bn laird without notice of a superior title, believing himself to be the absolute owner, aid will be given him only upon terms that he shall make due compensation to such innocent person to the extent of the enhanced value of the premises by reason of the meliorations or improvements, upon the principle that he who seeks equity must do equity.’ Here it will be'noted that the claimant must be an innocent person, and in any correct statement of the principle will be found this or some *285 equivalent requirement indicating that the occupant made the expenditures in good faith — that is, that he believed, and had reasonable ground to believe, at the time they were made, that he was the true owner.” Under this statement of the doctrine, it will be noticed that, in order to make his claim good, it is incumbent on defendant to show that the improvements were made in good faith, at a time when he believed, and had good reason to believe, that he was' the true owner. And we are of opinion that, on the testimony, every essential of this requirement has been met; for, while the Court of last resort has held that the clause of the will in question gave to defendant’s grantor, E. L. Eaison, only a life estate, this construction overruled the decision of the lower Court, which had taken a contrary view of its-meaning, showing that the matter was not free from difficulty. And it furthermore appeared that the 'defendant had been in possession of the land, asserting absolute ownership, for more than thirty years, under a deed conveying to him a title in fee executed by Edward L. Eaison and wife .and Matthew <T. Eaison, the trustee named in the will, and that the land -had been bought and' paid for by defendant, and these deeds taken under.advice of counsel learned in the law, that the execution of the deeds by Edward L. Eaison and the trustee, would convey the true title. The testimony offered by defendant tending to establish these facts was directly relevant to the issue, and, under the circumstances indicated, we are of opinion that, under our decisions, the Court, as stated, correctly ruled that the defendant’s claim for betterments should be submitted to the jury. R. R. v. McCaskill, 98 N. C., 526; Justice v. Baxter, 93 N. C., 405. We do not understand that the decision of Merritt v. Scott, 81 N. C., 385, cited and relied on by plaintiffs, is contrary to the disposition we make of the present appeal. In that case, as we interpret it, John Merritt, who had a life estate in the land in controversy, and who was in possession, claim *286 ing to own sucli interest, conveyed this life estate to one John Oox, and on the death of John Oox, his administrators, under Court proceedings, sold the land and conveyed same to defendant in fee. On 'action brought by the remainder-men, the defendant sought to set up a claim for betterments, by reason of improvements made by the life tenant when he was in possession claiming the land as life tenant, and also for improvements by himself after he purchased and obtained a deed for the land, and the Court, in disallowing the claim for improvements made by the life tenamt, said : “We think it clear that improvements of any hind put upon land by a life tenant during his occupancy, constitute no charge upon the land when it passes to the remainderman. He is entitled to the property in its improved state, without deduction for its increased value by reason of good management, or the erection of buildings by the life tenant, for the obvious reason that the latter is improving his own property and for his own present benefit. This proposition is too plain to need the citation of authority:” The defendant seems to have recovered for improvements made by him after he bought the land and entered, claiming to own the same in fee, having a deed purporting to convey such a title, and in that view the decision is authority favoring defendant’s position. The objection further made, that defendant’s claim could not be asserted on this trial, is without merit. By fair intendment, the claim was made in the answer, and the . disposition of the matter at the same time the question of title was disposed of, is directly sanctioned by the statute. Revis'al, section 652, under the title of “Betterments,” contains the provision: “That in any such action, such enquiry and assessment may be made upon the trial of the cause.” There is no error, and the judgment below is affirmed. No error.