Christmon v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co.

Walker, J., after stating tbe case: Tbe plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages merely because bis wife became ill, as the message was not of tbe character to indicate that a failure to send it would naturally and probably cause her illness. Such a result was not in tbe contemplation of tbe parties, and tbe *198 judge so charged the jury. But in this case the defendant was notified by the message, and the information given to its operator, that Mrs. Christmon was in a very nervous condition, so much so that her husband would not send the message directly to her, but addressed it to a friend, who was to “break the news to her” in such way, according to his judgment and in the exercise of prudence and caution, as would prevent any harmful results. This information, with the message itself, was sufficient to notify the defendant that its contents would surprise and disappoint Mrs. Christmon, and almost the only inference to be drawn was that he had changed the date of his arrival at Dunn, making it 'later than he had before intended and as she had understood from him it would be. Why should he send a telegram at all, not addressed to her, but to his friend, informing her that he would be at home the next day, if she would not expect him to come sooner? If he had not already set any earlier time for his arrival, and the time of his return to his home had been left indefinite, a simple message that he would be there the next day would not be calculated to alarm her at all, but would have rather the contrary effect. The facts in our case show that the husband was anxious about the delicate condition of his wife and wished her to be informed of his arrival the next day as soon as possible, for he used the telegraph instead of the mail. Why would she be alarmed by such a message, under ordinary circumstances, or if he had not told her that he would be home sooner? It was some evidence for the jury to consider upon the question of damages arising from the mental anguish caused by its negligence, and perhaps is stronger than evidence held sufficient in some of the decided cases. Dayvis v. Telegraph Co., 139 N. C., 79; Suttle v. Telegraph Co., 148 N. C., 480. In the case last cited, after stating that there was evidence that the company was informed as to the nature of the message and could have inferred what the consequences of delay would more than likely be, we said: “It (the company) cannot close its mind to the knowledge of facts which are apparent, and thus plead its own ignorance as an excuse for its failure to deliver the message. If it carelessly disregarded the information *199 it received, and its evident import, its fault in this respect is not to be imputed to the plaintiff, so as to bar her right to damages. The operator was told by Mr. Suttle what his purpose was in sending the message and in asking for a prompt delivery that evening. It was to avoid the very thing that has occurred, and which every reasonable man, mindful of his obligation to others, should have known would occur. The delay of the company was clearly the proximate cause of the injury.” And in Dayvis v. Telegraph Co., supra, Justice Hoke said: “This message was sent to prevent anxiety in the plaintiff’s mind, and but for the defendant’s default it would have fulfilled its mission.” This record, in one respect, presents a stronger case for the plaintiff than did the facts in the cases cited, as here the feme plaintiff’s delicate physical condition must be considered, and her great susceptibility to mental disturbance or mental anguish. The court would not perinit the jury to award damages merely because the feme plaintiff was made ill. This was carefully excluded by the judge. It was relevant' to prove that her condition was serious, if not critical, in order that the jury might infer therefrom that she suffered mental anguish, so that the defendant’s prayer for instructions was fully answered in this respect. There was sufficient evidence of the loss of Ohristmon’s letter to his wife, stating that he would be at home on the afternoon of 13 January, if it was necessary tb produce the letter, it being a collateral matter. S. v. Ferguson, 107 N. C., 841; S. v. Credle, 91 N. C., 640; 8. v. Surles, 117 N. C., 721; Whitehurst v. Padgett, 157 N. C., 424. Mrs. Christmon testified that she did not preserve her husband’s letters, and he stated that he had searched for it in every place where his wife kept her letters and papers, and could not find it. At the request of Mrs. Christmon, T. Y. Smith sent a telegram to R. B. Whitley at Wendell, N. C., requesting Christmon “to «orne home at once,” as his wife was very sick. The charges for this message were not prepaid, and Whitley told the operator at Wendell to apply the money paid by Christmon for the other message to the payment of the charges on the message to *200 him, and the court was requested to charge that, if they found these to be the facts, Mrs. Christmon had waived her right to recover damages for any negligence in not sending and delivering the message from her husband. But this does not follow. Whitley had no 'authority to direct such an application of the money, and, besides, the negligence had already occurred when he ghve the order. No error.