Bray v. Williams.

Connor, J., after stating the case. The learned counsel for the plaintiff concede that the validity of the statute of 1903 may not be called into question collaterally, and that the testimony offered was not competent for such purpose. They say, however, that the purpose of the proposed testimony was to show that by reason of the conduct of the defendant in procuring its introduction and passage, he is estop-ped from pleading its provision or availing himself of its benefits. Eor this proposition they cite Bigelow on Estop-pel, 689. Mr. Bigelow, referring to the case in which it is held that persons who have procured the passage of an act of the Legislature, under which they have acted and obtained *390 benefits, are estopped to show that the statute is unconstitutional, says that it is “a remarkable case and to be received with hesitation.” Ferguson v. Landram, 5 Bush. (Ky.), 230. It must be conceded that cases may be found in which it is held that parties are estopped from averring the unconstitutionality of a statute after accepting and appropriating the benefits- conferred by it. They are, however, of very narrow scope and application. The general rule is otherwise. While not in all respects in point, the language of Bradley, J., in Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S., 260, states the general principle: “That which purports to be a law of a State is a law, or it is not a law according as the truth of the fact may be, and not according to the shifting circumstances of the parties. It would be an intolerable state of things if a document purporting to be an act of the Legislature could thus be a law in one case and for one party, and not a law in another case and for another party; a law to-day and not a law to-morrow.” Without undertaking to review the authorities, we are of the opinion that the case before us does not come within the principle upon which the cases cited by Mr. Bigelow are based. There was no misrepresentation of any fact to the General Assembly, nor was the act, so far as the record shows, passed in violation of any constitutional provision. It has been frequently held that, except in the case, of bills coming within the provisions of section 14, Article II, this Court will not hear testimony for the purpose of showing that the notice required by the Constitution, section 12, Article II, was not given. Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C., 244; Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N. C., 119; Wilson v. Markley, 133 N. C., 616. It is always within the power of either branch of the General Assembly to suspend its rules and pass ordinary bills through their several readings on the same day. Unless objection is made it is usual to dó so. The fact proposed to be shown that the member introducing the bill agreed that the plaintiff *391 should not be notified, was a matter between him and his constituents. There was no duty imposed upon the defendant or the General Assembly to notify the plaintiff. The testimony was properly rejected. The effect of the statute upon the plaintiff’s right to proceed with his action was considered and settled by this Court in Dyer v. Ellington, 126 N. C., 941. We can add nothing to what was said in that case by Mr. Justice Douglas. The question is discussed and the authorities reviewed in an able argument by Mr. Chase in Norris v. Crocker, 54 U. S., 429. It is suggested that the act violates section 7, Article I of the Constitution. Such legislation is not in harmony with the genius of our Constitution, but we find no express provision prohibiting the General Assembly from passing such statutes. In Dyer v. Ellington, supra, this Court upheld an act substantially like the one before us. The defendant presented a hard case to the General Assembly. That it should have given the relief is not surprising. The plaintiff contends that, in any point of view, he is entitled to the costs which accrued prior to the passage of the act. We find no direct authority upon the question. The language of Mr. Justice Douglas in Dyer v. Ellington, supra, indicates an opinion against the plaintiff’s contention. The act makes no reference to costs. The recovery of costs is regulated by statute. The plaintiff brought his suit, knowing that the Legislature had the power to destroy his cause of action at any time before judgment. He took chances and must abide the result. The judgment must be Affirmed.