Craven County v. . Investment Co.

Adams, J. With respect to parties and causes of action there is a distinction between proceedings in courts of law and proceedings in courts of equity. The object of the common-law courts as originally constituted was to reduce the litigation to a single issue and upon such issue to obtain a decision — on an issue of law from the court and on an issue of fact from the jury; but by statutory enactment several distinct issues were permissible in the same action. In courts of equity the object sought is a complete decree on the general merits — -the administration of justice by settling the rights of all parties interested in the subject-matter of the suit. Hence it is that all persons materially interested therein, whether legally or beneficially, should be made parties, however numerous, so that all may be bound by the final decree. Story’s Equity Pleadings, sec. 72, et seq. This does not imply that a suit may be prosecuted on a bill or complaint which is multifarious. It is not permissible to unite in one complaint several matters of an entirely distinct and independent nature against several defendants, thereby compelling the joinder of several defenses upon unrelated matters. “But,” says Story, “the objection must still be confined to cases where the case of each particular defendant is entirely distinct and separate in its subject-matter from that of the other defendants; for the case against one defendant may be so entire as to be incapable of being prosecuted in several suits; and yet some other defendant may be a necessary party to some portion only *529 of tbe ease stated. In tbe latter case, tbe objection of multifariousness could not be allowed to prevail. So, it is not indispensable tbat all tbe parties should bave an interest in all tbe matters contained in tbe suit; it will be sufficient if eacb party bas an interest in some matters in tbe suit, and tbey are connected witb tbe others.” Eq. PL, sec. 211(a). Prior to tbe adoption of Code of Civil Procedure this practice prevailed in equitable proceedings in this State. It was applied in Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C., 313. In discussing tbe objection of multifariousness tbe Court held tbat tbe principle can apply only when two things concur: (1) when tbe different grounds of-suit are wholly distinct and (2) when eacb ground would sustain a bill. In explanation of tbe principle Ruffin, C. J., said: “If tbe grounds of tbe bill be not entirely distinct and wholly unconnected; if tbey arise out of one and tbe same transaction or series of transactions, forming one course of dealing and all tending to one end; if one connected story can be told of tbe whole, then tbe objection cannot apply.” A change in tbe practice was made when tbe Code of Civil Procedure was adopted and it was provided tbat tbe plaintiff may in certain cases unite in tbe same complaint several causes of action. C. S., 507. It was tbe purpose of tbe Code substantially to conform to tbe old equity practice and “to look to those old landmarks for a guide through tbe mist tbat enveloped the subject.” Young v. Young, 81 N. C., 92. In tbe cited case Ashe, J., who delivered tbe opinion, remarked tbat while it was tbe object of tbe General Assembly by adopting tbe Code of Civil Procedure to avoid a multiplicity of suits and prevent protracted and vexatious litigation, tbe first subdivision of tbe section bas given rise to more unprofitable litigation and fine-spun disquisitions upon its construction than any other section.” By reason of tbe unsuccessful attempt to define and definitely to limit tbe scope of tbe section providing for tbe joinder of causes, tbe Court suggested in Heggie v. Hill, 95 N. C., 303, tbat it makes no substantial change in tbe rules which formerly prevailed in courts of equity except to enlarge tbe right of uniting several causes in one action, tbe purpose being, as stated by Pearson, O. J., “to extend tbe right of plaintiffs to join actions, not merely by including equitable as well as legal causes of action, but to make tbe ground broad enough to cover all causes of actions which a plaintiff may bave against a defendant arising out of tbe same subject of action.” Hamlin v. Tucker, 72 N. C., 502. It is said in tbe opinion tbat tbe court may of its own motion refuse to pass upon matters which are not germane if tbe action becomes so complicated and confused as to embarrass tbe court in its investigation. Tbe attempt to conform these provisions to tbe practice *530 in equity brought about tie following as one of tie results: “No general rule has been or can be adopted with regard to multifariousness. It is most usually a question -of convenience, in deciding wiici tie courts consider tie nature or tie causes united, and if tiey are of so different and dissimilar a character as to put tie defendant to great and useless expense tiey will not permit them to be litigated in tie same records; but where tie different causes of action are of tie same character and between tie same parties plaintiffs and defendants, and none other, and no additional expense or trouble will be incurred by tie joinder of tie several causes, tie courts, in tie exercise of a sound discretion, on tie ground of convenience, usually refuse to entertain an objection to tie joinder.” Quarry Co. v. Construction Co., 151 N. C., 345. Tie motion to strike out certain allegations is based upon tie contention that tie complaint sets out two causes of action wiici are distinct and unrelated, one in contract, another in tort. It is insisted that tie cause stated in tie first nineteen paragraphs is ex contractu and that tie cause stated in tie remaining paragraphs is ex delicto, and that tie two cannot properly be united in one action. True, at common law there could'be no such joinder. Logan v. Wallis, 76 N. C., 416; Doughty v. R. R., 78 N. C., 22. But under tie reformed procedure it is held as a general proposition that several causes may be united if they arise out of tie same transaction or a transaction connected with tie same subject of action, whether legal or equitable, whether in contract or in tort. Cook v. Smith, 119 N. C., 350; Daniels v. Fowler, 120 N. C., 14; Reynolds v. R. R., 136 N. C., 345; Hawk v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C., 47; Worth v. Trust Co., 152 N. C., 242. There was, therefore, no error in denying tie motions of tie defendants. Tie elements of contract and tort are so closely related as to preclude tie defendants’ right to require an election, and to make tie allegations of tie complaint tie recital of a series of transactions connected with tie same subject of action, and not objectionable as multifarious. Hosiery Mill v. Hosiery Mill, 198 N. C., 596. Tie Investment Company is a party defendant and as it is insolvent it is properly represented by a receiver. Judgment Affirmed.