Ex Parte Barefoot

Adams, J., after stating tbe case: N. J. Lee was tbe only son of Julius A. Lee. While bis father was living be died intestate without lineal descendants, leaving sisters of tbe whole blood who, with tbe children of a deceased sister, are tbe original petitioners. Tbe intervening petitioners are collateral relations of tbe half-blood of N. J. Lee, being of tbe blood of bis mother but not of bis father, and in this capacity they claim an interest in tbe land in suit. Tbe trial court adjudged that they have no interest in tbe land and they excepted and appealed. Tbe fourth canon of descent is in these words: “On failure of lineal descendants, and where tbe inheritance has been transmitted by descent from an ancestor, or has been derived by gift, devise or settlement from an ancestor, to whom tbe person thus advanced would, in tbe event of such ancestor’s death, have been tbe heir or one of tbe heirs, tbe inheritance shall descend to tbe next collateral relations, capable of inheriting, of tbe person last seized, who were of tbe blood of such ancestor, subject to tbe two preceding rules.” C. S., 1654, Rule 4. This rule must be construed in connection with tbe sixth, which provides that collateral relations of tbe half-blood shall inherit equally with those of tbe whole blood, and that tbe degrees of relationship shall be computed according to tbe rules which prevail in descents at common law. Paul v. Carter, 153 N. C., 26; Noble v. Williams, 167 N. C., 112. It is thus enacted that collateral relations of the half-blood shall inherit equally with those of the whole blood in all cases excepting those particularly stated in the fourth rule. The exceptions are these: (1) cases in which the inheritance has been transmitted to the propositus by descent from an ancestor; (2) cases in which it has been derived by gift, devise, or settlement from an ancestor to whom the person so advanced (the propositus) would in the event of the ancestor’s death have been the heir or one of the heirs. In these two cases the inheritance shall descend to the next collateral relations of the propositus who are of the blood of the ancestor from whom it was derived. In Burgwyn v. Devereux, 23 N. C., 582, Chief Justice Puffin observed that “purchased estates' — in the popular sense of the term, purchase — descend to the nearest relations, whether of the paternal or maternal line; and that descended estates and certain purchased estates (which the act puts on the same footing with those descended) descend to the nearest relations of the blood of the ancestor or person from whom the estate moved.” The purchased estates which are on “the same footing” with estates descended are those derived from an ancestor by gift, devise, or settle *397 ment. C. S., 1654, Rule 4; Bell v. Dozier, 12 N. C., 333; Felton v. Billups, 19 N. C., 308; Wilkerson v. Bracken, 24 N. C., 315; Gillespie v. Foy, 40 N. C., 280; Osborne v. Widenhouse, 56 N. C., 238; Dozier v. Grandy, 66 N. C., 484; Watson v. Sullivan, 153 N. C., 246; Poisson v. Pettaway, 159 N. C., 650; Forbes v. Savage, 173 N. C., 706. Tbe immediate question, then, is this: Did N. J. Lee acquire his inheritance or title from his father by descent, devise, gift, or settlement? The clerk held that the deed to N. J. Lee was not such a conveyance of purchase as would change the line of descent and create a new line of inheritance. His conclusion was based in part upon the consideration recited in the first deed, the reservation of a life estate and of the right of dower, and the father’s retained possession of the land — “the home place” — until his death. Without reference to these recitals the trial judge affirmed the clerk’s judgment in general terms. If J. A. Lee had died intestate, seized of the land in fee, N. J. Lee would have been one of his heirs; but if, subject to the life tenure, the son acquired his interest for value as a “purchased estate” and not by descent or by purchase in the sense of a gift, devise, or settlement, the judgment cannot be upheld. He did not take title by devise: his father died intestate. The word “gift” ordinarily imports a voluntary transfer of property by one person to another without consideration or compensation. And with respect to advancements the law is explicit. If a father having several children conveys valuable land to one of them for love and affection, or for a nominal consideration, he is presumed to have intended an advancement, the consideration not being meritorious. Harper v. Harper, 92 N. C., 300; Powell v. Morisey, 98 N. C., 426; Stevens v. Wooten, 190 N. C., 378. The judgment appealed from may have been founded on this principle; but in such event the presumption may be rebutted by proof that the conveyance was made for value. Harper v. Harper, supra. In this case the deed recites a consideration of natural love and the payment of one hundred and sixty dollars. The words “natural love” do not qualify the estate. Mosely v. Mosely, 87 N. C., 69. The consideration named in the deed is presumed to be correct. Faust v. Faust, 144 N. C., 383. As we have said, not being contractual it may be inquired into by parol evidence; but we have discovered no parol evidence to contradict the recital. As there is no such evidence we may assume that the grantee paid Massengill $160 in satisfaction of a judgment which was a lien on the land. This payment was a valuable consideration. Institute v. Mebane, 165 N. C., 644; Fertilizer Co. v. Eason, 194 N. C., 244; Trust Co. v. Anagnos, 196 N. C., 327. It was not merely nominal. Retaining a life estate, Julius A. Lee retained also the possession of the *398 land. Whether he could have done so if the judgment had not been satisfied is not determined. At any rate the release of the lien was a benefit to the grantor and a detriment, loss, or inconvenience to the grantee who paid the money. No evidence was offered to show that the sum paid was not “near the value of the conveyed property.” Kiger v. Terry, 119 N. C., 456. Is it not reasonable to conclude upon the admitted facts and upon an inspection of the first deed that the parties regarded the recited consideration as at least approximating the value of the interest conveyed? The appellees say that the second deed' conveyed no title and amounts to nothing. Buchanan v. Clark, 164 N. C., 56. The record shows that it was “offered and admitted as evidence.” If it was considered as evidence of the inadequacy of the consideration named in the first deed why should not the admitted receipt of $1,200 be accepted as proof that full value was paid ? If we disregard the second deed, we are still led to the conclusion that the consideration set out in the first deed is-meritorious, that the grantee’s estate was acquired by purchase, and .not by descent, gift, devise, or settlement, and that the intervening, petitioners are entitled to the relief prayed. Judgment Reversed.