Coit v. Owenby-Wofford Co.

Hoke, J. The decisions of this State are to the effect that, in condemning a right of way, under ordinary proceedings, the railroad acquires an easement in the property, to be held and used as the necessities and well ordered management of the road may require, and that the company authorities are made the judges of the* extent and necessities of this use. R. R. v. McLean, 1 58 N. C., 498; Earnhardt v. R.. R., 157 N. C., 358; R. R. v. Olive, 142 N. C., 273. The eases further hold' that, to the extent that the land covered by the right of way is not presently required for the purposes of the road, the owner may continue to occupy and use it in a manner not inconsistent with the full and proper enjoyment of the easement. R. R. v. McLean, supra; Lumber Co. v. Hines Bros., 126 N. C., 254; Sturgeon v. R. R., 120 N. C., 225. In the practical application of these recognized principles, here and elsewhere, it is very generally held that, while a railroad company may not use or license the use of its right of way or depot grounds for purposes strictly individual or private, it may erect *139 thereon any and all buildings and superstructures reasonably required for the convenience of the company as a corporation and in promotion and furtherance of its corporate business; and what it may do for itself and for like purpose, it may permit or license to its patrons to the extent that it does not hinder or interfere with the proper performance of its duties to the public. In the well considered and learned brief of defendant’s counsel we were referred to numerous decisions to the effect that railroad companies could not he held for trespass on the rights of the owner in erecting or permitting the erection on its right of way and in furtherance of the company’s business, coal chutes, sheds, elevators, platforms, and conveniences of all kinds affording facilities for receipt and shipment of freight, such as lumber yards, stock yards and pens, storage-houses, etc., and even hotels and boarding-houses Avhen carried on for the accommodation or benefit of passengers and company employees, an instance of which occurs in our own reports in Gudger v. R. R., 116 N. C., 481, and see, also, Anderson v. Interstate Manufacturing Co., Iowa, 132 N. W., 152, reported with an instructive note in 36 L. R. A. (N. S.), at page 512; Gurley v. Minneapolis Elevator Co., 63 Minn., 70; Pierce v. R. R., 141 Mass., 481; Hartford Ins. Co. v. Chicago and Mil. R. R., 175 U. S., 91; Grand Trunk Ry. v. Richardson, 91 U. S., 468; Ill. Central v. Wathen, 17 Ill. App., 580. In Grand Trunk Ry. v. Richardson, supra, Associate Justice Strong, delivering the opinion, said: “It is not doubted that the defendant might have erected similar structures on the ground on which the plaintiffs’ buildings were placed, if in its judgment the structures were convenient for the receipt and delivery of freight on its road. Such erections would not have been inconsistent with the purposes for which its charter was granted. And if the company might have put up the buildings, why might it not license others to do the same thing for the same object, namely, the increase of its facilities for the receipt and delivery of freight ?” These authorities and the principle which they uphold and illustrate are in full support of his Honor’s judgment awarding a nonsuit, for it 'appears, by correct inter- *140 pretatiou of tbe only. testimony relevant to tbe question, tbat, while tbe user of tbe warehouse was restricted to tbe private business of tbe lessees, its chief and controlling purpose was to afford facilities for these lessees, as patrons of tbe road, in tbe storage, receipt and shipment of freight. 1 ’ There is no error, and tbe judgment of nonsuit must be Affirmed.