Quantz v. Railroad

Connor, J., after stating the case. His 'Honor told the jury that the plaintiff had, at the time of his injury, ceased to be a passenger; in this we concur. We also concur in the *138 opinion that be was not a trespasser. He was a licensee’. His relation to tbe defendant, growing out of tbe contract of carriage or tbe assumption of a public duty by tbe defendant, was at an end. Tbe case, thus simplified, presents tbe question as to tbe measure of duty wliicb tbe defendant owed tbe plaintiff as a licensee. Tbe plaintiffs right to- recover is dependent upon sustaining tbe proposition tbat tbe defendant owed to bim a duty, and that there was. a breach thereof, which was the proximate cause of tbe injury. Emry v. Navigation Co., 111 N. C., 94, 17 L. R. A., 699. It is conceded that the defendant did not owe to the plaintiff tbat high degree of care due a passenger. It is equally clear that it owed to bim a higher degree of care than was due a trespasser. Tbe authorities make a distinction between the degree of care due a mere licensee, one who by permission enters upon tbe premises of another and one who’ does so by invitation. It is not always easy to say upon which side of this line a particular case falls. Assuming tbat tbe license given to tbe public to use this way to pass from Fourth to Trade street amounted to implied invitation to the plaintiff to enter upon and pass over it, we next enquire tbe extent of tbe license. It was to pass from fourth to- Trade street. Tbe duty therefore of the defendant was to keep^ the way free from dangerous obstructions or pitfalls, either on or so near to tbe way tbat a person exercising ordinary care would not be injured. Tbe plaintiff went over tbe way for bis own purpose, having no connection whatever with tire defendant’s duty to tbe public as a common carrier. There is no suggestion that there was any obstruction to prevent tbe plaintiff using tbe way to tbe full extent of bis license. He went twelve feet out of bis way to go to tbe front of the depot to look for a policeman for tbe purpose of ascertaining tbe whereabouts of a person whom he wished to find. There is no suggestion that tbe open door was dangerously near to tbe open space. Certainly *139 tbe defendant was not required to so construct its depot, before tbe license was given, as to enable licensees to walk around about and enter it all times by day or nigbt for purposes entirely disconnected with tbe use for which it was built. Tbe defendant owed no duty to tbe plaintiff to keep all of the doors of tbe depot building closed at nigbt. No reasonable person would appreheiad that in using the open space for tbe purpose of passing from one street to another a person would go twelve feet out of tbe way and step into’ an open door. We can see no breach of duty to tbe plaintiff. We have discussed tbe case upon the assumption that tbe plaintiff was an invited licensee. It is by no means clear that tbe license was more than permissive, in which case a lower degree of care is imposed. In any view of tbe testimony tbe defendant was not liable. Sweeny v. Railroad, 10 Allen, 388, 87 Am. Dec., 644; Redigon v. Railroad, 155 Mass., 44, 14 L. R. A., 276, 31 Am. St. Rep., 520. “One who attempts to cross a platform at a railroad station for bis own convenience as a. short cut from one street to another, is a mere licensee and cannot recover for an injury received by falling into a bole in such platform, although the railroad company bad passively permitted tbe plaintiff and the public generally to use it.” Elliott on Railroads, sec. 1251. We are of the opinion that the motion for nonsuit should have been allowed. Error.