A. Brinkley & Co. v. Ballance

Clark, J. This case in its facts is an almost exact duplicate of Bales v. Sultan, 111 N. C., 94. The feme defendant was doing a mercantile business in 1893, under the style of Ballance & Co. — J. W. Ballance, her husband, the other defendant, being the manager in active charge. It is alleged in the complaint, and admitted in the answer, that the said ■firm (the wife) contracted with plaintiffs the indebtedness sued for of $334, between January 1, 1893, and August 26, 1893, and that on February 9, 1893, her husband wrote the following letter to the plaintiff: “Gentlemen!: — Tours to hand, and in reply would say. that our stock of goods is worth $6,000, and we owe $1,500. We own real estate worth $4,000, unincumbered. We thought we gave these points to your young man, and we also thought the writer was too well known here and in Norfolk to need much reference, as Im did business here for many years, pleased the people and' made money. I bought tírese goods because I especially needed them Saturday. If you wish to ship them, and can put them here by Saturday noon, you can do> SO'. Otherwise, I do not want them. Respectfully, Ballance! & Co., by J. W.. Ballance.” *395 The answer, it is true, denies that tbe le'gal effect of this letter was the written consent of the husband, and further avers that the goods so bought have long since been paid for, but payment is a matter to be proved by the defendant, and no evidence was introduced tending to prove it. The complaint avers that all of the account now due was purchased, relying upon said letter as the husband’s written consent. On the contrary, at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence “the Court intimated that in no aspect of the evidence could there be a recovery had of my personal judgment against the feme defendant, nor against any separate estate, real or personal, of which she was seized or possessed.” The Code, sec. 1826, provides that no married woman not a free trader, shall mate any contract to affect her real or personal estate without the written, consent of her husband, except in three instances specified, to-wit, for her necessary personal expenses, for support of her family, or to pay her ante-nuptial debts. It is not contended that the contract for the purchase of these goods was for the support of the family, though the husband was insolvent, and the family was largely supported from the store. Hence the case does not come within the classes dispensing with the necessity of the husband’s written consent, as in Bazemore v. Mountain, 121 N. C., 59, and S. C., at this term. The sole question here is whether the letter above set out is a written consent of the husband for the purchase of these goods from the plaintiffs. An examination of it will show that on its face it is an order of goods by the husband as agent for his wife, and there is not only his consent thereto by malting the order, but his hearty concurrence by giving a schedule of the property, real and personal, owned by the wife, for she constituted the firm, and an appeal to his own personal standing in Norfolk as a reason why the goods should be shipped. Could there be a *396 more explicit consent than a request to ship the goods because of “the writer’s” good standing ? It does not appear that any part of tire bill of goods, the purchase of which is admitted, was bought at any other time, hut, if this had been shown, it was error to' hold that “in no aspect of the case could there be any recovery against the feme defendant, nor against her property, real or personal.” The case of Bates v. Sultan, supra*, is too recent to permit of any discussion whether the letter of February 9, 1893, aibounted to a written, consent of the husband. The opinion of Montgomery, J., in that case has been cited and recognized as authority in Bank v. Ireland, 122 N. C., 571; in Walton v. Bristol, 125 N. C., 419, and again at this term by Furches, J., in Jennings v. Hinton. At this term in Jennings v. Hinton it was properly held that a husband witnessing a deed of his wife was a sufficient written assent to her mating such deed. The Code, sec. 1826, requires tire written consent of the husband to validate his -wife’s contract (except in those cases in which his consent is unnecessary). Certainly then his writing for the goods, giving a schedule of the real and personal property owned by the firm (his wife), and appealing to his personal standing why the goods should be shipped, and using the pronouns “he” and “I” is as full consent as his signature as a witness to a deed by his wife would have been, or as the let-tea.’ of the husband in Bates v. Sultan, supra. An examination of the Constitution, Art. X, sec. 6, and of the statute, Code, 1826, shows no foundation for the “charging” of the wife’s property as laid down in some decisions of a former Court. The Constitution requires only the written assent of the husband to, “conveyances,” and sec. 1826 requires, only the written consent of the husband to contracts affecting the wife’s “real or personal” estate, in certain cases, dispensing with it in others. But even under that doctrine of “charg *397 ing” it is expressly held that it is unnecessary that the assent of the husband should be signified by a separate clause. “His execution, of the paper jointly with his wife is a sufficient compliance with the law.” Jones v. Craigmiles, 114 N. C., 613. Here, the husband not only ordered the goods as agent of'his wife, but joins in the letter an appeal to his own personal standing, as a reason for the shipment. The complaint is specific and complies with the reqniret-men-t of Bates v. Sultan. The wife admits she got the goods and of the value charged. She got them on an order written by her husband as her agent, and he signs his name, and refers to himself as “he” and “I,” and “the writer,” and insists upon the shipment of the goods. If this is his “written consent,” then under sec. 1826 of The Code the contract is valid and binding on the wife, and in holding that no recovery could be had against her, nor against either her personal or real property, there was error. The Judge should not have taken the case from the jury, but should have left it to them with appropriate instructions upon the disputed issues of fact. New trial. Faircuoth, O. J., dissents.