In Re the Adoption of Holder

Seawell, J. The facts pertinent to the decision of this case are sufficiently set out above, and repetition will be avoided as far as possible. The petitioner challenges the validity of the proceeding for the adoption of the child Ellen Louise Holder. He contends that the proceeding is wanting in certain essentials to its validity, namely, notice to the parents of. the child, or either of them, consent of such parents, or proof and finding of such parental abandonment as would render such notice and consent unnecessary. He furthermore contends that upon the evidence in this case no order of adoption was ever made or entered. After careful examination of the record, with the aid of able briefs of counsel on both sides, we are of the opinion that these objections of the petitioner are ineluctable. Truelove v. Parker, 191 N. C., 430, 132 S. E., 395; Ward v. Howard, 217 N. C., 201; In re Shelton, 203 N. C., 75, 164 S. E., 332. Facts sustaining the jurisdiction should affirmatively appear. Here, on the contrary, it is clear from the record that neither parent was made a party to the proceeding or gave consent to the adoption in the manner contemplated by. the statute. This, in the cited cases, is held to be essential to jurisdiction of the subject matter. Abandonment is not suggested in the adoption proceeding and, of course, no finding was made with regard to it. There is nothing, however, in the record which could be construed to indicate an abandonment in the statutory or legal sense. In re Shelton, supra; Truelove v. Parker, supra, p. 438; S. v. Whitener, 93 N. C., 590. The respondent contends that the consent of the mother is to he inferred from the conditions under which she surrendered custody of the child to the Children’s Home Society of North Carolina, Inc., and from the clause in the paper writing signed by her, above quoted, and that this was available in the adoption proceeding as, so to speak, relayed from the mother. We regard it as insufficient for that purpose. The consent noted in the adoption proceeding is the -consent of the Children’s Home Society of North Carolina, Inc., and not that of the mother. *141 This sort of attempted innovation on tbe law of adoption was dealt with in Ward v. Howard, supra, at p. 206. We quote: “As to what time — relative to the adoption proceeding — consent of the living parent may be obtained, whether before or after the institution of such proceeding, we need not here consider. The consent must at least be in fair contemplation of the proposed adoption, and this includes its most essential feature — the identity of the adoptive parents. Except in the case of abandonment, it is not without reason that society looks first to the concern and foresight of the natural parents in the selection for the child adoptive parents into whose hands they surrender the duties and burdens of custody, training, and tuition; and when we come to the question of property rights affected, the proceeding concerns a public policy, which does not rest alone upon custodial right.” Under the statute, the consent must appear within and not dehors the proceeding, and must have reference to the particular proceeding which will culminate in adoption. Jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon a blanket release or consent on the part of the parent that the child may be adopted in whatsoever proceeding may be brought and to whomsoever may apply. This Court has been careful to preserve the principle of certainty in adoption proceedings, since the laws of inheritance and distribution of property are directly involved. The social importance of preserving the integrity of this system is as great as that involved in the benevolent reconstruction of family relations. The proceeding is in derogation of the common law and must be •strictly construed. Grimes v. Grimes, 207 N. C., 778, 178 S. E., 573. We do not find in this record evidence to sustain the position of either •court before whom the matters were heard that any order of adoption was actually either made or entered, and the signing of the order nunc pro tunc was wholly unjustified. Neither does it appear that Ellen Louise Holder was ever within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Guilford County. The fact that the home office of the corporation — the Children’s Home Society of North Carolina, Inc. — was in Greensboro would not give her constructive residence there. Her actual residence, ■down to the time she was delivered to Mrs. Bullock, was in Forsyth County, and, thereafter, in Horry County, South Carolina. Burrowes v. Burrowes, 210 N. C., 788, 188 S. E., 648. There is much evidence in the record — omitted in the above statement — which has no bearing on'the issues of the case, but which, nevertheless, is calculated to engage the humanities. This prompts some comment, which is not intended to be homiletic, but may afford a helpful suggestion. Considering the nature and great importance of the adoption of children into the home and family in comparison with most other trans *142 actions of life, it seems to us amazing that so little regard is often paid to the vital necessity of legality. The necessary steps are easy to understand and easy to observe, and only a fair degree of attention at the right time will serve to prevent frustration, disappointment and heartbreak. One cause of such recurring disappointments seems to lie in the mistaken notion that some of the essential elements of the proceeding may be initiated in the juvenile court, or, as in this instance, that some institution or agency to which the child has been committed may take over and exercise functions which the statute leaves exclusively to the parent or guardian. A clearer understanding of the limitations of jurisdiction and authority of the various agencies dealing with the custody and welfare of children is imperative. We have reached the conclusion that the proceeding challenged by the petitioner, culminating in the purported adoption of Ellen Louise Holder,-is void for the-reasons assigned. The judgment of the court below is Eeversed.