Roseman v. Carolina Central Railroad

Avery, J.: The plaintiff’s intestate got upon the defendant’s passenger train at Iron Station, and, failing or refusing to produce a ticket or pay fare on demand of the conductor, was ejected a little more than a half mile from that place and within two hundred yards of a dwelling-house. There was testimony tending to show that the intestate appeared to be drunk at the station while the passengers were taking supper there, and had come as a passenger from Stanley to Iron Station (about twenty-one miles) on the same train, having purchased a ticket from one station to the *716 other. The conductor testified that he considered him neither sober nor drunk, and a witness for the plaintiff corroborated his statement that the intestate when ordered to get off the train followed him to the platform and then stepped off without assistance from the brakeman, who held his' lamp for him to see in alighting. The only direct evidence as to the nature of the ground where he was ejected was that of the conductor, who said that he went down an embankment about three foot high. He was found next morning frozen and in the water that had collected near the center of an embankment eight feet high, three-fourths of a mile from the station. Where there is no statute prescribing where or when recusant or disorderly passengers must be ejected, the officer in charge of trains, as a rule, is authorized to expel, without using unnecessary force, one -who refuses to pay regular fare, at any point where he may safely get off. Pickens v. Railroad, 104 N. C., 312; Clark v. Railroad, 91 N. C., 506. The statute (The Code, §1962) affirms this right, subject to the limitation that the expulsion must be either “at any usual stopping-place or near any dwelling-house, as the conductor shall elect, on stopping the train.” It is admitted that the plaintiff’s intestate was put off) without using force, near a dwelling-house, and not remote from a station. But, where the power expressly given by law is exercised in such a manner as to willfully and wantonly expose the ejected person to danger of life or limb, the company is still liable for injury or death resulting from the expulsion. Cases, falling within this last exception to the general rule and not intended to be included under the statute, -arise where the persons ejected are manifestly too infirm to travel or too much intoxicated to be trusted to find the way to the nearest house or station. 3 Wood R. R. Law, sec. 362; 2 Sherman & Red. Neg., sec. 493; Railroad v. Right, 34 Am. Rep., 277. *717 The question, therefore, which first confronts us is whether in any view of the testimony the conductor had reasonable ground to believe that the plaintiff’s intestate was so greatly under the influence of liquor as to be unable to find his way or walk to the nearest house or to the station. He was put off the train on the night of the 16th of November, 1889. According to the testimony of Miller for plaintiff and that of the conductor, it was not raining, nor was it freezing at that earl}'' hour of the evening, though later in the night there was sleet, and the ground was frozen next morning. The conductor had heard intestate’s demand for food at the supper-house and had seen him supplied. He next saw that he had got on the train and found him awake and declaring that he had neither money nor ticket. When told that he must get off the intestate arose, walked to the platform and got off without assistance. Under such circumstances was it the duty of the conductor to take him free of charge to the next station, lest he should drink more, or the intoxicants that he had already drunk should take effect and subsequently render him unable to travel? We think not. It was but natural to infer that one who could find his way to the eating-house and demand food and thence into the train again could follow a road hard by when he was put off, and which it seems the conductor knew led to his father’s house only a short distance off. His boisterous behavior at the station, so far as it seems to have come under the observation of the conductor, clearly indicated that it might become necessary to expel him for disorderly conduct, but was not calculated to excite apprehension that he might prove physically unable to return to the station or reach a house in the immediate vicinity of the point where he'got off. The statement of the conductor that he saw him land without assistance “ safe upon the ground ” *718 being undisputed by any direct evidence, the conductor was warranted in acting upon the supposition that he would seek and reach a place of safety. Had he shown symptoms of infirmity or of stupor in presence of the conductor, or had there been any dispute as to what the demeanor of the intestate had been in his presence, it might hare been for the jury to determine whether the conductor had reason to believe he was physically or mentally incapacitated for traveling by reason of intoxication. Waiving the objection to the competency of the question propounded to Aider-man by the witness Miller, just after the deceased was expelled, we think that the answer of the former, “Oh, no; he lives near here, and it is only a few hundred yards to the station,” sufficiently shows the reasonableness of his course from his own stand-point. It would place a premium upon drunkenness and subject companies and passengers to needless delay and danger if officers in charge of trains were bound, in order to save the companies harmless, to act upon an off-hand opinion ventured by a passenger instead of their own well-founded view of the situation, and stop the train to hunt for or pick up an ejected trespasser. This is one of the thousands of terrible casualties due to the immoderate use of spirituous liquors. If there is a moral accountability at the d oor of any person other than the victim, or should be a legal liability elsewhere, we see no ground for saddling the responsibility upon a common carrier whose conveyances aro so frequently resorted to by such boisterous and violent men to the annoyance of sober and orderly passengers. We are unwilling to lay down the principle that a conductor subjects his company to liability for refusing to act upon the volunteer opinion of any passenger as to the physical or mental state of a drunken man who has been expelled. *719 AVe think that there was no evidence, competent or incompetent, that fairly raised the question whether the conductor had reasonable ground to believe that the intestate was too infirm by reason of intoxication to reach a place whore he would be safe, and upon the answer to that inquiry the liability of the company depended. In the absence of any sufficient testimony to make the company liable for willful disregard of the intestate’s danger on the part of Alderman wo think that the Court below erred in submitting the case to the jury at all. In this view of the evidence it is unnecessary to mention particular prayers for instructions, or exceptions arising from the refusal to give them. In the most favorable aspect of the testimony for the plaintiff the conductor had notice that the deceased was drinking and disposed to be quarrelsome at the station, and saw that lie was under the influence of liquor when he was expelled from the train; but there was no evidence of physical infirmity or mental incapacity, such as to excite a reasonable apprehension that he would be unable to walk to a house or to his home. Alderman was not bound, because of what he did see and hear, to institute inquiry among the other passengers before ejecting the intestate, or to act upon their opinions given afterwards, when he had no reason to believe that the intoxication had deprived the intestate of the mental capacity to find his way, or the physical power to follow it to a neighboring house or to the station. However much such accidents are to be deplored justice and public policy alike forbid that the failure of the conductor in charge of a train to consult the follow-passengers of a man who refuses to pay fare and appears to be somewhat intoxicated, as to his ability to provide for his own safety, shall be declared negligence, such that a jury are at liberty to find it the proximate cause of injury or death befalling him after expulsion. *720 'For the reasons given we think there was error in submitting the question of defendant’s negligence to the jury at all upon the evidence, and the defendant is therefore entitled to a New Trial.