Coxe v. . Charles Stores Co.

Stacy, C. J. The question for decision is whether guardians may lease the real property of their infant wards for a period extending beyond the guardianship or the minority of the wards with the approval of a court of general equity jurisdiction. While the question appears to be one of first impression in this jurisdiction, from all the reasoning in our decisions on the subject, its proper solution would seem to be involved in no serious doubt. It is conceded that under C. S., 2172, the guardians, without the court's approval, would have no authority to lease the premises for a term in excess of the current year in which the infant wards shall become of age. In the absence of statutory authority, a guardian cannot overreach his time so as to bind the ward. Melton v. McKesson, 35 N. C., 475; Van Doren, 5 N. J. L., 460, 8 Am. Dec., 615; 12 R. C. L., 1126. By the express terms of the statute, guardians are permitted to lease the lands of their infant wards “for a term not exceeding the end of the current year in which the infant shall become of age, or die in nonage. But no guardian, without leave of the clerk of the Superior Court, shall lease any land of his ward without impeachment of waste, or for a term of more than three years, unless at a rent not less than three per centum on the assessed taxable value of the land.” The enactment would seem to be a limitation upon the discretionary powers of guardians, and not upon the authority of a court of chancery having supervision and oversight over their conduct. The matter intended to be regulated was not the abuse of power by the court, but by guardians when not acting under the restraint of its orders. Barcello v. Hapgood, 118 N. C., 712, 24 S. E., 124. The Superior Courts of this State, by statute, C. S., 2180, and in the exercise of their chancery jurisdiction, have ample authority to order the sale or mortgage of the real estate of infants, upon application of *383 their guardians showing that the interests of the wards would be materially promoted thereby, Watson v. Watson, 56 N. C., 400; Ex parte Dodd, 62 N. C., 97; Rowland v. Thompson, 73 N. C., 504, and we think it must be held upon authority, as well as upon reason, that the power to order sales and mortgages includes the lesser power to approve leases where it clearly appears that such would be to the best interests of the infant wards. Annotation 1916F L. B. A., 499. It is observed that while formerly a guardian was not permitted to mortgage his ward’s property for a term of years “exceeding the minority of the ward,” this limitation was stricken out by ch. 67, Public Laws 1923, and the term was made dependent upon the decree of the court. C. S., 2180. Granting the power of a court of equity to dispose of the fee in a minor’s real estate when it appears that such is manifestly to his interest, it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that the disposition of a lesser estate upon the same ground might equally be sanctioned by the court. Ricardi v. Gaboury, 115 Tenn., 484, 89 S. W., 98. The general jurisdiction of the court over the property of infants, aided by the statutes on the subject, would appear to be sufficient to confer the authority. Springs v. Scott, 132 N. C., 548, 44 S. E., 116. Indeed, the court stands in loco parentis to infants and it may change their estates from realty into personalty, and from personalty into realty, whenever it deems such a proceeding most beneficial to the infant. C. S., 2181; Latta v. Trustees, 213 N. C., 462, 196 S. E., 862; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N. C., 578, 182 S. E., 341. Speaking generally to the subject in Bank v. Alexander, 188 N. C., 667, 125 S. E., 385, Adams, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, said: “It is unquestionable that courts of equity have general jurisdiction over the property of infants.and that infancy alone is sufficient to sustain the right of supervision. The jurisdiction in all cases is complete and may be exercised in order to afford relief wherever it may be necessary to preserve and protect the estates and interests of those who are under age. The petition states facts and circumstances which invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity to preserve the corpus of the estate and in this way to work out what the decree adjudges to be the best interests of the infant defendants. 3 Story’s Eq. Jurisprudence, 14 ed., sec. 1742 et seq.; 10 B. C. L., 340, sec. 89; 31 C. J., 1035, see. 97; Morris v. Gentry, 89 N. C., 248; Tate v. Mott, 96 N. C., 19.” In the case of Cecil v. Salisbury, 2 Vern., 224, the English High Court of Chancery (1691) declared: “This court hath often decreed building leases for sixty years of infants’ estates, where for their benefit.” And this was said without reference to any enabling statute or act of Parliament. Cabin Valley Mining Co. v. Hall, 53 Okla., 760, 155 Pac., 570, L. R. A., 1916F, 493; Ricardi v. Gaboury, supra. Cf. *384 Beauchamp v. Bertig, 90 Ark., 351, 119 S. W., 75, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.), 659. It bas been held in a number of cases that our Superior Courts are endowed with, authority equal to that of the English High Court of Chancery in dealing with the property of infants. Williams v. Harrington, 33 N. C., 616; Button v. Schonwald, 86 N. C., 198; Morris v. Gentry, 89 N. C., 252; Tale v. Mott, 96 N. C., 19, 2 S. E., 176; Harriss v. Richardson, 15 N. C., 279. The judgment of the Superior Court will be upheld. Affirmed.