Smith v. . Nimocks

MeeRIMON, J. (after stating the facts). Statements and admissions in the pleadings in an action, may be evidence against the party making them, just as if he had made them in any other connection or manner, and if the same should be competent for any purpose, on the trial of the issues of fact, they may be received as evidence. There is nothing in the nature of a pleading, that necessarily places admissions in it of a party, on a footing different from what they would be, if made elsewhere. The pleadings ordinarily create and afford no immunity as to *245 facts stated in them, when it becomes necessary to use such facts ■as evidence. Indeed, pleadings themselves may be evidence in proper cases. Adams v. Utley, 87 N. C., 356 ; Guy v. Manuel, 89 N. C., 83; Brooks, v. Brooks, 90 N. C., 142. But such evidence must be introduced on the trial, at the proper time and in the proper way. This is necessary in order to afford the party to be affected adversely by it, just opportunity to explain, modify or correct it. He might be able to show that the admissions or statements were made by inadvertence, mistake or misapprehension, and the law allows him reasonable and orderly opportunity to do so. It never tolerates undue advantage. State v. Whit, 5 Jones, 224. It is a mistaken notion that the whole record, including the pleadings, in an action, is necessarily in evidence, and may be read to the jury as of course on the trial of issues of fact. The Court has charge and cognizance of, and it is its province to act upon the record, and apply the admissions of the parties, and such other evidence as may appear in it, according to law. The only office of the jury, ordinarily, is to act upon the issues of fact submitted to them by the Court. So much of the pleadings ought to be read to them, in that connection, under the direction -of the Court, as may be necessary to present and point clearly, the nature and scope of the issue, but not for the purpose, of evidence. If either party desires to have the benefit of the pleadings, or admissions of fact in them, he may, if the same be competent, introduce them, as indicated above, and only in that manner. No doubt the Court might, in the exercise of a sound discretion, allow the pleadings or admissions in them as evidence, when competent, to be introduced after, in the order of the trial, the' introduction of evidence regularly had been closed, but it would •do so in such way as to give the party to be affected by it adversely, opportunity to be heard in respect to it. Any other course of practice would certainly contravene equal fairness and justice to the parties. *246 In tins case, there were two answers, one verified, the other not, and the.Court allowed the counsel of the plaintiff, after the-introduction of evidence had been closed, in the course of his-argument to the jury, to read the latter to them, the counsel for-■the defendant objecting. Exactly for what purpose it was read, does not appear. But it could not have been for the purpose of explaining the nature of the issues or any of them, because, the answer read was a simple, broad denial of each of the allegations of the complaint, and it contained an alleged counterclaim. This answer was abandoned, and a second verified answer, in which the counter-claim was entirely omitted, supplied its place. So that no issue was raised in respect to the-counter-claim, and none such was submitted. The obvious purpose was to take advantage of some express or implied admission or statement in the counter-claim alleged and abandoned, as evidence. It may be, it was read to show, by implication from it, that the defendant had the plaintiff arrested by virtue of the-State’s warrant, or as an implied admission of the substance of the allegations of the complaint. It was intended to serve the purpose of evidence in some aspect of the case presented to the jury by the counsel, and as-we can see that it may have had material weight with the jury, adverse to the defendant, he is entitled to a new trial. The answer was not put in evidence, if it' was competent at all, and the counsel had no right to refer to it, much less to read it in the-course of his argument. There are many other exceptions, some of them resting upon very technical grounds. We think that the most, if not all of' them, are untenable, and it is not necessary to advert further to them. There is error. The defendant is entitled to a new trial, and to that end, let this opinion be certified to the Superior Court.. It is so ordered. Error. Reversed.