State v. . Deadmon

BbogdeN, J. The question is this: Upon indictment for burning a barn under C. S., 4242, is evidence that another barn had burned where the defendant was living sometime prior to the burning in controversy, competent and admissible? The point is raised by the testimony of witness Scott. It did not appear from the testimony when the fire occurred at Statesville or whether or not the defendant had insurance upon the property or not; neither did it appear as to whether or not the fire was of incendiary origin. The defendant objected to the testimony before it was offered and excepted to any statement made by the witness relating to the fire at Statesville, *707 notwithstanding the court permitted the testimony and after the testimony was in the case the defendant again objected and excepted. The principle of law applicable to the facts disclosed is thus stated in S. v. Beam, 184 N. C., 730, 115 S. E., 176. “One who commits a crime may be more likely to commit another; yet, logically, one crime does not prove another, nor-tend to prove another, unless there is such a relation between them that proof of one tends to prove the other. Unless such a relation exists, it is illegal and manifestly unfair to require a man who is charged with a specific crime in the indictment to prepare a defense against other crimes that the State may attempt to prove against him, but which are not charged in the bill. The general rule should, therefore be strictly enforced in all cases where applicable.” There are certain exceptions to this general rule, when it becomes necessary to show intent, design or guilty knowledge, to make out the res gestas, to prove identity or to establish a chain of circumstantial evidence upon the offense charged. However, upon the element of intent the court held in S. v. Jeffries, 117 N. C., 727, 23 S. E., 163, “If such testimony be admissible to prove such intent, the 'collateral offense’ sought to be proved must be confined to a time before, or just about the time, the offense charged against the defendant is alleged to have been committed.” “There must be a causal relation or logical and natural connection between the two acts, or they must form parts of but one transaction. Where one offense constitutes a necessary element of "another, proof may be made thereof.” S. v. Beam, 184 N. C., 736, 115 S. E., 176. To the same effect is the holding in S. v. Graham, 121 N. C., 623, 28 S. E., 409 : “Evidence of a distinct, substantive offense cannot be admitted in support of another offense, as a general rule. . . . It is when the transactions are so connected or contemporaneous as to form a continuing action that evidence of the collateral offense will be heard to prove the intent of the offense charged.” Again in S. v. Dail, 191 N. C., 231, 131 S. E., 573, Stacy, C. J., stated the rule thus: “It is undoubtedly the general rule of law that evidence of a distinct substantive offense is inadmissible to prove another and independent crime, the two being wholly disconnected and in no way related to each other.” S. v. Thompson, 97 N. C., 496, 1 S. E., 921; S. v. Murphy, 84 N. C., 742; S. v. McCall, 131 N. C., 798, 42 S. E., 894; S. v. Stancill, 178 N. C., 683, 100 S. E., 241; S. v. Beam, 179 N. C., 768, 103 S. E., 370. The evidence in controversy does not fall within any of the exceptions to the general rule so firmly and thoroughly established in the law. The exception of defendant thereto is sustained and a new trial awarded. New trial.