In Re Inheritance Tax From the Estate of White

Hoke, J., after stating the ease: The law imposing a tax on inheritances, sec. 6, subsec. 1, provides, among other things: First. Where the person or persons entitled to any beneficial interest in such property shall be the lineal issue or lineal ancestor or husband or wife of the person who died possessed of such property aforesaid, or where the person to whom such property shall be devised or bequeathed stood in the relation of child to the person who died possessed of such property aforesaid,' at the rate of $1 for each and every $100 of the clear value of such interest in such property; and this clause shall apply to all cases where the taxes have not been paid by the executor or administrator or other representative of the deceased person. The clerk of the Superior Court shall determine whether any person to whom property is so devised or bequeathed stands in the relation of child to the decedent,” and allows an exemption of $2,000 each on persons coming within the class described. On persons taking beneficial interest in property by devise, inheritance, etc., and not coming within this description, a higher tax is imposed, and no exemption allowed. Eeferring to the language of the statute, it is clear that the words used, “or where the person to whom such property shall be devised or bequeathed stood in the relation of child to the person who died possessed of such property,” are in addition to lineal issue or ancestors, these last being expressly named, and that they are not restricted to persons formally adopted as children, for this could have- been readily specified and expressed. The words, therefore, are more inclusive and, in our opinion, on perusal of the entire provision, including “and the clerk of the Superior Court shall determine whether any person to whom property is so devised or bequeathed stands in the relation of child to the decedent,” the law referred and intended to refer the question to the courts: primarily to the sound, legal discretion of the clerk, as a mixed question of law and fact, and that the words extend to and include all meritorious cases where the parties had assumed and continued to live in the relationship of parent and child or where they lived in mutual recognition of such relationship. This was held to be the correct construction of the statute in the recent case of State ex rel. Shaw, Solicitor, v. Bridgers, 161 N. C., pp. 246, 259, where the words in question were held to “include and apply to daughters-in-law who were in every way deserving and were treated and recognized as children by the testatrix.” Speaking to the question in that case, the Court said: “In our view, however, these legatees should each be considered and dealt with as one standing 'in the relation of child to the decedent under *357 clause 1, sec. 6, of tbe statute. This clause imposes a tax of % of 1 per cent on legacies to tbe lineal issue or lineal ancestor of decedent or to bis brother or sister or to ‘one wbo stood in relation of child to such decedent/ this, in case of question, to be determined in tbe first instance by tbe clerk of tbe Superior Court. This provision, in our opinion, refers and was intended to refer to tbe case of widows or widowers, and other cases could be suggested to tbe decision of tbe courts and to relieve them, when legatees, from tbe higher rate imposed on strangers to tbe blood of tbe decedent in all eases where they were deserving of this favor. From a perusal of tbe will, showing tbe tenderest concern for these legatees, and from their known deserving, these daughters-in-law should be considered as standing in tbe relation of children and only be subject'to tbe lighter tax imposed on tbe lineal issue of deceased.” And tbe position has been recognized as sound in principle in other jurisdictions. Ross on Inheritance Taxation, sec. 138; 37 Cyc., pp. 1571-72. Tbe interpretation adopted is required by tbe general and inclusive nature of tbe descriptive words, “one wbo stood in tbe relation of child to decedent,” and is more insistent in view of tbe additional clause, “and tbe clerk shall determine whether any person to whom property is bequeathed stands in tbe relation of child.” On tbe facts, as established, we are of opinion that tbe petitioner stood in tbe relationship of child to tbe decedent, within tbe meaning of tbe law, and this will be certified, that judgment may be so entered and tbe taxes assessed and exemption allowed accordingly.' Reversed.