Thermal Belt Sanitarium Co. v. Hartford Insurance Co.

Hoke, J., after stating the case: The descriptive words of this policy and the physical placing of the cottages and their use and purpose in connection with the plant and its operation are made to appear further as follows: “The location of the buildings is on top of the hill above the town, consisting of one administration building, which is a two-story frame metal-roof building, longer than wide, with nothing in the way of a lean-to nailed- to the building. The rest of the sanitarium property consisted of four cottages, one story, metal roof, consisting of four rooms,'bath and trunk room, located in a semicircle; two cottages, No. 1 and No. 4, about'20 feet from each comer of the main building, the other cottages about 20 feet distant from each other, making a half circle around the f„ront of the main building. They have an electric bell system. There was a *555 series of wires running from each, room of each cottage to the hall of the administration building, and there was also a water supply system, extending from a tank on the upper part of the grounds to the main building, and from the main building to all the cottages, one continuous system. Also a sewerage system accommodating all four cottages, one line going from the main building to a cesspool, and a line going from each of the cottages to the main line. There was a push-button in each room, so that when the patients needed assistance they could ring the bell in the main building. Q. What were those cottages used for? . A. Sleeping rooms for the patients. Q. Used for any other purpose? A. No. Q. Were there any kitchens, dining-rooms, or laundry in these cottages? A. No. Q. How were they used in connection with the main building? Defendant’s objection overruled; defendant excepts. A. Used as sleeping-rooms for patients. The patients used those for bedrooms and went to the main building for meals, if well enough. '(Defendant’s objection overruled; defendant excepts.) And for consultation with physicians; but if not well enough, the meals were sent out from the main building, and if in their beds, the doctor’s nurses visited them in their rooms. On this or similar facts there is authority tending to support the position that the cottages would come within the descriptive terms of the policies as a matter of law. Massey v. Belisle, 24 N. C., 170; Marsh v. Insurance Co., 71 N. H, 252; Maitherson v. Kimball, 70 Ark., 451. But in any event — and this, in our opinion, is the more correct view — the words are so far ambiguous as to permit the parol testimony in aid. of the description and so as to carry out the true intent and agreement of the parties. R. R. v. R. R., 147 N. C., 382; Ward v. Gay, 137 N. C., 400; Merriam v. U. S., 107 U. S., 441; Sargent v. Adams, 69 Mass., 72; Robinson v. Insurance Co., 87 Me., 399; Lumber Co. v. Insurance Co., 145 Mich., 558. Insurance Co. v. Tye, 1 Ga. App., 380, an authority much relied upon by defendant, could well be distinguished from the case *556 presented here. Tbe decision iiroceeds upon tbe supposition tbat under certain conditions parol evidence could be received witb tbe view and purpose of changing tbe conclusion reached. When we consider tbe relevant facts in evidence, tbe position of tbe cottages, only 20 feet away, tbe physical connections between these and tbe main building in reference to water, light, sewerage, etc., “tbe inseparable identity of use” and witb nothing to fill tbe descriptive words, “adjoining and communicating additions,” except tbe cottages, there is assuredly no error to defendant’s prejudice in referring tbe question to tbe jury as to whether tbe policy did and was intended to cover and protect tbe cottages. Tbe position is not affected by tbe fact tbat a former policy bad insured tbe main building and tbe cottages in separate and different amounts. This is an opposing fact, bearing on tbe weight of tbe testimony objected to, and did not affect its competency. It was this fact which called forth tbe protest of plaintiff’s officials as to tbe insufficiency of tbe description, and which was quieted by the assurance of tbe company’s agent tbat tbe description as written would include tbe cottages. There was no reversible error in permitting tbe witness to say tbat plaintiff was tbe owner of tbe property. This is a case where title is presumed prima facie- from tbe possession and control of tbe property, and, further, tbe issuance of tbe “policy to tbe insured” was itself prima facie evidence of title, conclusive for tbe purposes of such an action as this unless in some way questioned or impeached. 19 Cyc., 941. There is no error, and tbe judgment for plaintiff is affirmed. No error.