Morris v. . Osborne

Avert, J. — after stating the facts: His Honor told the jury that if “Thos. A. Osborne had capacity to know what he was doing, and the consequences of his act, and that he signed the endorsement on the note, intending and meaning to signify and acknowledge that the debt had not been paid,” they would find that the presumption of payment had been rebutted. A sane person is presumed in law to intend the natural and necessary consequences of his own acts. 5 Am. & En. Cy., 753, and authorities cited. It was conceded, on the argument, that it was not erroneous to instruct the jury, as a rule for testing *612 mental capacity, tfaat the person whose act is drawn in question, must, in order to maintain the validity of it, be shown to know what he is doing, and the consequences of Ms ad, or that he must be capable, in this case, of understanding the meaning and import of the endorsement on the note signed by him. If Osborne knew what he was doing, and the consequences of his act, it would follow inevitably that he understood when he signed the endorsement, “Renewed. January 26,1884,” that he was acknowledging that he had not paid the note, and that his obligation to pay was still subsisting, and further, that, comprehending this, he must have meant, or intended, to signify, that the debt had not been paid.’ This is but another method of defining the measure of mental capacity sufficient to qualify a person to make a valid contract. While it is not safe, or advisable, to attempt to frame formulas that are synonymous with rules repeatedly approved by the Courts as criterions of capacity to contract, we see nothing erroneous, or calculated to mislead the jury, in the language objected to in this case, when considered in connection with the testimony and other portions of the charge. We do not intend to approve this direction as adapted to every case involving mental capacity to contract. The law does not demand that a person shall have unusual culture or capacity to qualify him to make a valid will, but that he shall know the “nature and character of the property disposed of, who are the objects of his bounty, and how he is disposing of the property among the objects of his bounty.” Bost v. Bost, 87 N. C., 477. It would not be erroneous, in speaking of a testator, to say that he must have intended, or meant, that one of his children should have certain stocks, another bonds, and a third land, according to the provisions of the will, after his death. If he knew what he was doing, he knew that this would be the necessary result of making such a will, and he meant *613 to signify his intent that such natural consequences should grow out of the act. So, when Thos. Osborne signed the endorsement, “Renewed, January 26, 1884,” if he knew what he was doing, he did it to show, or acknowledge, that the debt evidenced by the note was still due and unpaid. The power to bind one’s self by an agreement cannot be made to depend upon ability to foresee the remote consequences of an act, but a sane man must intend the natural, immediate and inevitable results that follow and grow out of his acts. There is no error. Affirmed.