Walker v. Town of Faison

BkogdeN, J. Can a city or town “contract any debt, pledge its faith, or loan its credit” for the purpose of acquiring a site for a cotton and truck platform? *696 Tbe issue of tbe notes by tbe defendant in payment of tbe purchase price of tbe property was not submitted to a -vote of tbe people and bence tbe validity of tbe indebtedness depends upon whether a cotton and truck platform is a “necessary municipal expense,” within tbe purview of tbe North Carolina Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 7. Tbe -law is an expanding science designed to march with tbe advancing battalions of life and progress and to safeguard and interpret tbe changing needs of a commonwealth or community. Consequently it has been observed by tbe sages that tbe luxuries of one period oftentimes constitute tbe necessities of another. However, the latest interpretation of tbe term “necessary municipal expense” is found in Henderson v. Wilmington, 191 N. C., 269, 132 S. E., 25. In delivering tbe opinion, Adams, J., wrote: “Tbe cases declaring certain expenses to have been ‘necessary’ refer to some phase of municipal government. This Court, as far as we are advised, has given no decision to tbe contrary.” Further expanding tbe idea, tbe Court says: “With tbe mere utility of tbe enterprise we are not concerned. Whether ‘shipping, foreign and coastwise’ would expand commerce is alien to tbe principle we are considering. Tbe convenience, tbe benefit to be conferred upon a particular class, the insufficiency of present facilities, and a want of opportunity for commercial or industrial competition — these and similar premises are not factors that can control or even contribute to our'solution of tbe present controversy. We are dealing exclusively with a question of law, with tbe legal formalities necessary to pledging tbe faith of tbe city by issuing bonds for tbe contemplated purpose; and as these formalities are mandatory they may no’t be disregarded or ignored.” Tbe defendant insists that tbe proposed cotton and truck platform should be classified as a necessary municipal expense for tbe reason that such'a structure and tbe proposed use thereof constitute a “market.” Tbe statutes duly enacted by tbe General Assembly and tbe decisions of this Court have established tbe proposition that municipal markets constitute a “necessary municipal expense,” authorizing governing authorities to issue notes or bonds without popular vote for tbe acquisition and maintenance thereof. C. S., 2674, 2687, 2791 and 2794. Smith v. New Bern 70 N. C., 14; Swinson v. Mount Olive, 147 N. C., 611, 61 S. E., 569; LeRoy v. Elizabeth City, 166 N. C., 93, 81 S. E., 1072; Angelo v. Winston-Salem, 193 N. C., 207, 136 S. E., 489. But is a cotton and truck platform a market as contemplated and defined by law? Apparently tbe term market was first defined by this Court in 1874 in tbe case of Smith v. New Bern, supra. Tbe Court said: “Market, a public place appointed by public authority, where all sorts of things necessary for tbe subsistence or for tbe convenience of life are *697 sold.” The definition so given bas been widely quoted with approval.' Various definitions may be found in 18 R. C. L., p. 367. The term is usually associated with the sale, inspection and supervision of food and food products designed for use by persons and extended by some courts to include food for domestic animals. Manifestly the underlying idea in the term is the sale of products intended and designed primarily for human consumption. In the case at bar the evidence discloses that the purchase was made and the platform erected “to get revenue for the town, and for the purpose of a cotton platform to buy and weigh cotton and load and unload, ... to store truck on when it got overloaded.” There is no evidence that any citizen of the town bought any' truck from the platform for the purpose of consumption. Obviously the purchase and operation of the platform was a commercial enterprise, promising a profit for the municipality, but upon the admitted facts, the enterprise did- not constitute a necessary governmental expense of the defendant town, and the motions for nonsuit should have been allowed. Reversed. ClabKSON, J., dissenting.