Cooper v. . Cooper

Staoy, C. J. Tbe case was brought back for further consideration in connection with tbe alleged insufficiency of tbe description of tbe property on tbe tax list to warrant a valid sale by tbe sheriff for nonpayment of taxes. Tbe property in question is specifically described in tbe complaint, and tbe pertinent findings made “by agreement of all parties” follow: “That tbis proceeding was instituted on tbe 18th day of October, 1940, by tbe plaintiffs, who are the heirs-at-law of W. H. H. Cooper, deceased, and tbe remaindermen of tbe property described in tbe complaint. “That tbe defendant is the owner of the life estate in said property as widow of tbe said W. H. H. Cooper. “That taxes for tbe year 1937, and for tbe years 1938, 1939 and 1940, at tbe time of tbe institution of tbis action, were not fully paid; that tbe Sheriff of Pasquotank County, on October 3, 1938, offered for sale at tbe courthouse door of said county the real estate described in tbe complaint for tbe nonpayment of 1937 taxes, tbe said notice of sale describing tbe real estate, along with several other parcels of land belonging to other parties, as follows: 'Mrs. W. H. H. Cooper, 4 lots, amount of tax $32.80.’ That said land on tbe said 3rd day of October, 1938, was bought in by Pasquotank County; that tbe same was not redeemed until the 21st day of October, 1940.” It is alleged and admitted that tbe property was listed for taxes by the defendant. Under such listing she later paid tbe taxes oil tbe property, including tbe taxes for 1940. She failed to redeem, however, within one year after tbe sale of tbe tax lien on 3 October, 1938. Tbis is tbe gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint and against which tbe statute inveighs. The argument is now advanced that tbe listing was not sufficient to warrant a sale by tbe sheriff for tbe 1937 delinquent taxes, and for this reason, it is contended, tbe plaintiffs are not entitled to invoke tbe forfeiture of tbe statute, C. S., 7982. There are several answers to tbe position. In tbe first place, it seems to be an afterthought. Tbe only exception appearing on the record is “in rendering and signing tbe judgment set out in tbe record.” Tbis presents only tbe question whether error appears on the face of tbe record. Query v. Ins. Co., 218 N. C., 386, 11 S. E. (2d), 139; Jones v. Griggs, 219 N. C., 700, 14 S. E. (2d), 836. *126 Secondly, tbe listing of tbe property was done by tbe defendant, and sbe bad full knowledge of tbe description and tbe property thereby intended to be designated. Her effort to redeem, after tbe year was made without suggestion of any defect in tbe listing, and the 1940 taxes were paid by her under tbe same conditions. A life tenant who lists real property for taxes and thereafter suffers same to be sold by reason of bis neglect or refusal to pay tbe taxes on tbe property so listed, and fails to redeem within a year after sale of tbe tax lien by the sheriff, ought not be permitted to set the statute at naught, either wittingly or unwittingly, by tbe simple device of an inadequate listing. Fulcher v. Fulcher, 122 N. C., 101, 29 S. E., 91. Such was not tbe intention of tbe General Assembly. See Nash v. Sutton, 109 N. C., 550, 14 S. E., 77. Thirdly, tbe operative finding on tbe instant record is, that “tbe sheriff of Pasquotank County, on October 3, 1938, offered for sale at tbe courthouse door of said county, tbe real estate described in tbe complaint,” etc. This was so understood at tbe time of tbe original bearing, and tbe point now urged was treated as Lilliputian or inconsequential. And so it is on tbe record as presented. It is impracticable to set out on tbe tax list a full description of all property listed for taxes. Reasonable certainty is all that is required. Stone v. Phillips, 176 N. C., 457, 97 S. E., 375. “The designation of land is sufficient, if it affords reasonable means of identification, and does not positively mislead tbe owner.” Cooley on Taxation, 407. Of course, the defendant will not be beard to say that sbe misled herself. Fulcher v. Fulcher, supra. Moreover, it is provided by ch. 310, Public Laws 1939, sec. 1715 (j), in repetition of earlier statutes, that tbe sale of tax liens is not to be invalidated by immaterial irregularities, among which is listed, “any defect in the description upon any . . . tax list . . . provided such description be sufficiently definite to enable tbe collector, or any person interested, to determine what property is meant or intended by tbe description, and in such cases a defective or indefinite description . . . may be made definite by using a correct description in any tax foreclosure proceeding authorized by this Act, and any such correction shall have tbe same force and effect as if said description bad been correct on tbe tax'list.” There is no contention here that anybody has been misled by tbe description. Rexford v. Phillips, 159 N. C., 213, 74 S. E., 337. The case of Bryson v. McCoy, 194 N. C., 91, 138 S. E., 420, cited and relied upon by tbe defendant, is not in point. There the validity of tbe sheriff’s deed was at issue, and not merely the sale of tbe tax lien. To be sure, tbe materiality of any irregularity may invite controversy. So it has here. But on tbe point presently urged, tbe defendant could hardly expect to prevail, notwithstanding her case has been presented with much learning and manifest research. *127 Whether tbe plaintiffs will “gain any permanent advantage by standing on tbe full measure of tbeir rights” is not for us to determine. Nor are we tbe judges of tbe wisdom or impolicy of tbe law. It is enough that tbe General Assembly has spoken on the subject. Wells v. Wells, 156 N. C., 246, 72 S. E., 311. Tbe defendant complains both at tbe law and at tbe insistence of tbe plaintiffs, but these are matters belonging not to tbe courts. They are for others to decide. It is ours only to declare tbe law as we find it and to apply it to tbe facts in band. S. v. Whitehurst, 212 N. C., 300, 193 S. E., 657. Tbe suggestion that moré is required than what appears here on tbe tax list and in tbe notice of sale finds no support in tbe decided cases, albeit tbe decision in Bryson v. McCoy, supra, is cited as authority for a contrary bolding. That case, however, is readily distinguishable from this one. Tbe difference has already been pointed out. Tbe requirements and purposes of tbe two cases are dissimilar. Tbe validity of tbe sheriff’s deed is not in question here — only tbe failure to redeem within a year after tbe sale of tbe tax lien. The other arguments made on behalf of tbe defendant are self-answerable. Petition dismissed. Sea well, J"., dissents.