Julian v. . Daniels

Hoke, J., after stating tbe case: There is no substantial difference in tbe testimony relevant to tbe issue, and, under our decisions on tbe subject, bis Honor correctly held tbat tbe question of reasonable inquiry was one of law for tbe court. Gray v. Lentz, 173 N. C., 346; Joyner v. *553 Harris, 157 N. C., 296; Furr v. Johnston, 140 N. C., 157; Joyner v. Roberts, 114 N. C., 389. And, on tbe record and facts in evidence, we concur also in bis Honor’s ruling tbat in tbis instance no reasonable inquiry was made. We bave beld in several well considered cases tbat where a matter of tbis kind necessarily depends upon inquiry, tbe register of deeds must seek bis information from persons known by bim to be reliable, or, if unknown, identified and approved by some reliable person known to be reliable. Assuredly so wben, as in tbis case, such sources of information are open to bim and readily accessible. Tbis test of responsibility, laid down by Associate Justice Connor in Trolinger v. Boroughs, 133 N. C., 312, as tbe proper construction of tbe statute and tbe fair deduction of tbe cases interpreting tbe same, was again formally stated by tbe same learned judge in Furr v. Johnston, 140 N. C., 157, and bas been repeatedly approved and applied by tbe Court in sustaining recoveries for tbis penalty. Gray v. Lentz, supra; Joyner v. Harris, supra; Morrison v. Teague, 143 N. C., 186 Agent v. Willis, 124 N. C., 29; Cole v. Laws, 104 N. C., 651. In illustration of tbe position, it was beld in Morrison v. Teague, Associate Justice Brown delivering tbe opinion, tbat “In an action .against a register of deeds to recover tbe penalty under Eevisal, sec. 2090, for issuing a marriage license contrary to its provisions, where tbe uncontradicted evidence showed tbat tbe register took tbe word of tbe prospective bridegroom and bis friend, neither of whom be knew, as to tbe age of tbe young lady, and made no further inquiry of any one, tbe court should bave given tbe plaintiff’s prayer for instruction tbat as a matter of law defendant failed to make reasonable inquiry as to tbe age of plaintiff’s daughter.” And in Cole v. Laws, supra: “When a register of deeds issues a license for tbe marriage of a woman under 18 years of age without tbe assent of her parents, upon tbe application of one of whose general character for reliability be was ignorant, and who falsely stated tbe age of tbe woman, without making any further inquiry as to bis sources of information: Held, tbat be bad not made such reasonable inquiry into tbe facts as tbe law required, and be incurred tbe penalty for tbe neglect of bis duty in tbat respect.” And in Joyner v. Harris: “It is not a reasonable inquiry by tbe register of deeds as to tbe age of tbe prospective bride which will relieve bim of tbe penalty of Eevisal, sec. 2083, forbidding tbe issuing of a license for tbe marriage of a woman under 18 years of age without tbe 'Consent of tbe person designated by tbe statute, for bim to rely solely upon tbe answers of those whom be did not know but merely trusted because of their manner and appearance, their information as to tbe age of tbe woman appearing to depend only upon what she bad told *554 them, and when by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence a means of obtaining reliable information could have been made available. Cole v. Laws, 104 N. C., 651; Morrison v. Teague, 143 N. C., 186, cited and applied.” In the cases cited for defendant, Walker v. Adams, 109 N. C., 481; Bowles v. Cochrane, 93 N. C., 398, and others, all of them so far as examined, except Harcum v. Marsh, 130 N. C., 154, the register acted upon information of parties known to him who professed also to be cognizant of the facts and where there was no reason for him to suspect the truth of their statements. The case of Ilarcum v. Marsh, to which we were also cited by defendant, has been disapproved in subsequent decisions as not being a helpful guide to the true interpretation of the statute. Gray v. Lentz, supra; Trolinger v. Boroughs, supra. Recurring to the testimony, it appears that this was a run-away match where a license was issued by defendant for the marriage of plaintiff’s daughter, residing with him at the time, and who was only 16 years of age; where no consent of any kind had been given and the father did not know or have any reason to believe that the young man had been paying his daughter attention likely to result in marriage; that on the occasion in question a party of four men came to his home in an automobile about 6 o’clock P. M., after office hours, and applied for a license for the marriage of Eloyd Kincaid, one of the party, to plaintiff’s daughter, Nona Thelma, not present; that the defendant practically issued the license on the statements of the prospective husband and his young friend calling himself G. D. Daniel, neither of whom was known to the register; that the witness Swicegood, who was known to the register, told him that he did not know the girl nor know her age, and that he did not know the witness Daniel; that he knew Kincaid and did not know anything against him. It further appeared that the father lived at Cooleemee, a village in Rowan County, near the Davie County line, and had done so for 20 years past, accessible by telephone, and no effort was made to communicate with the father or any of the girl’s relatives. The witness Swicegood, recalled by the court, stated that the register came to the door and called the witness in and asked him if he knew the parties applying for license, and that the witness replied that he knew Kincaid but did not know the girl or the other witnesses and there was no trouble that witness knew of, and defendant having testified that Swicegood told him he did not know the girl and that defendant “did not telephone Cooleemee or any other place, and did not ask the sheriff about it; that he did not think it was his duty to make any inquiry other than taking their oath and having them sign the same; that he made no further inquiry except taking the oath of Mr. Kincaid and Mr.-Daniels.” *555 It bas been often shown in our decisions on the subject that this requirement of reasonable inquiry is not merely a formal matter, wbicb is met by taking the oaths of the husband or other parties unknown to the register, but it is expressive of a sound principle of public policy designed to protect immature persons from hasty and ill-advised marriages, made without the consent of their parents or guardians or those having properly the care over them. Speaking to the question in Agent v. Willis, supra, Montgomery, J., said: “To all persons who believe that the welfare of human society depends largely on the family relation and that the contract of marriage should be defended by careful and just laws for the purpose of guarding against legal impediments and to prevent the marriage of those under a certain age when the parties are presumed to be unable to contract, the duty of the register of deeds, the officer in our State charged with the duty of issuing marriage licenses, seems most important and most solemn. That officer must exercise his duties carefully and conscientiously and not as a mere matter of form.” On careful consideration of the facts in evidence, we are of opinion that the cause has been correctly tried and judgment in plaintiff’s favor should be affirmed. No error.