Cabe v. . Board of Aldermen

*160 Hoke, J. The decisions of this State have repeatedly recognized and approved tbe principle tbat counties, townships, and other like municipal corporations, and to a large extent cities and towns, are simply agencies of the State constituted for the convenience of local administration in certain portions of the State’s territory, and that in the exercise of ordinary governmental functions they are subject to almost unlimited legislative control, the position extending to the imposition and expenditure of taxes raised for ordinary governmental purposes, and where not affected by special constitutional provisions. Trustees v. Webb, 155 N. C., 379; Jones v. Comrs. Madison County, 137 N. C., 579-596; Crocker v. Moore, 140 N. C., 429; Jones v. Comrs., 143 N. C., 59; White v. Comrs., 90 N. C., 441; Mills v. Williams, 33 N. C., 558. In the present instance it appears that the purpose for which these bonds were issued and sold, and that to which the proceeds are to be now applied are for ordinary current expenses, not requiring a vote of the people, and the original act contains the provision that the holders of these bonds are in no way required or charged with the duty of seeing to the application of the funds, so that there is no interfering constitutional provision, nor is there any private interest to be considered, the bonds being undoubtedly valid obligations of the town. Hightower v. Raleigh, 150 N. C., 569; Tate v. Comrs., 122 N. C., 812. True, we have held that without legislative sanction a municipal government may not of its own motion divert governmental funds from the purposes specified by the statutes under which they have been raised. Comrs. v. Comrs., 184 N. C., 463. But here there is a valid statute authorizing the proposed diversion, and no reason occurs to us why it should not be upheld. Authority, too, here and elsewhere, is in full support of the measure. Parker v. Comrs., 178 N. C., 92; Brown v. Comrs., 100 N. C., 92; Long v. Comrs., 76 N. C., 273; Yamhill Co. v. Foster, 53 Oregon, 124; 37 Cyc., 1588; 27 A. & E. (2 ed.), p. 868. In the Parker case, supra, it is pointed out that our constitutional provision, Article V, section 7, requiring that “every act of the General Assembly levying a tax shall state the special object to which it shall be applied, and it shall be applied to no other purpose” does not include or extend to taxes levied by counties, etc., for municipal purposes, citing Parker v. Comrs., 104 N. c., 166. There is no error, and the judgment of the Superior Court is Affirmed.