Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Johnson

*184 Beogden, J. Tbe deed of trust to Frelinghuysen, trustee, was a first lien upon tbe whole property. Tbis lien was properly foreclosed. Consequently, tbe purchaser at such sale, nothing else appearing, acquired a fee-simple title, unaffected by subsequent encumbrances. Hence, as tbe defendant Denning held no security but a junior lien, bis security disappeared, as there is no evidence and no finding that any surplus resulted from tbe sale. Denning, however, contends and asserts that Eifie Johnson and her husband, Z. M. Johnson, executed purchase money notes to the Commercial Land Company, which said notes are now owned by him and secured by a deed of trust to Newsome, trustee, reciting that the lands were free from encumbrance, and that when Effie Johnson became the purchaser of the property upon the sale under the first lien by Freling-huysen, trustee, that the title she acquired at such sale inured to the benefit of the trustee in the deed of trust securing the payment of the Denning notes, by way of feeding the estoppel. The legal support for such view is found in many decisions in this State. Quoting from 10 R. C. L., p. 677, this Court in Bechtel v. Bohannon, 198 N. C., 730, 153 S. E., 316, said: “A grantor of land with full covenants of warranty is estopped to claim any interest in the granted premises. And where he holds a prior mortgage on the premises, he can assert no rights as mortgagee against his grantee.” Hallyburton v. Slagle, 132 N. C., 947, 44 S. E., 655; James v. Griffin, 192 N. C., 285, 134 S. E., 849. In the present case, however, it is to be noted that Eifie Johnson and Z. M. Johnson, her husband, grantors in the deed of trust securing Den-ning’s notes, claim no interest in the land. Furthermore, the governing principles of law are stated in Door Co. v. Joyner, 182 N. C., 518, 109 S. E., 259, as follows: “Whatever may be the weight of judicial decisions on this subject, under general principles, the better considered authorities are agreed that under and by virtue of our registration acts, the prior registry shall prevail as against a title of estoppel except as to a purchaser with notice. And in determining this question of notice, the decisions hold that a purchaser having the prior registry is not affected with constructive notice by reason of deeds or claims arising against his immediate or other grantor prior to the time when such grantor acquired the title, but the deed or instrument first registered after such acquisition shall confer the better right.” Indeed, in the Joyner case, supra, it was strongly intimated by Justice Holce that the doctrine of title by estoppel cannot prevail against the registration law. Moreover, in Jackson v. Mills, 185 N. C., 53, 115 S. E., 881, it was held that the principle of title by estoppel or feeding the estoppel had no application in cases where the grantor afterwards acquired title through an independent source. See Annotation Martin v. Raleigh State Bank, 51 *185 A. L. R., 442, et seq.; Huzzey v. Hefferman, 9 N. E., 570; U. S. National Bank v. Miller, 58 A. L. R., 339, 25 A. L. R., 81. In the final analysis the plaintiff acquired title through a sale duly made in accordance with the power contained in a first lien upon the land, and the decisions of Door Co. v. Joyner and Jackson v. Mills, supra, fully support the judgment entered by the trial judge. Affirmed.