Williams v. . Hedgepeth

*116 Hoke, J. There was ample evidence to support the verdict, the cause was submitted to the jury under a correct and adequate charge, and we find no valid reason for disturbing the results of the trial. It is established by the great weight of authority, and is held for law in this jurisdiction, that where one under the guise of a purchase acquires the goods or property of another under a promise to pay or perform, and has at the time a settled purpose to do neither, such transaction will be regarded as a fraudulent one on the part of the pretended purchaser, and same may be set aside at the instance of the vendor. In Benjamin on Sales (7 ed.), at p. 470, the American Annotator states the position as follows: “Another well established species of fraud by a vendee is purchasing with a positive intention not to pay for the goods. If such intention were known to the vendor he certainly would not sell. Its suppression, therefore, is a legal fraud,” citing, among many other authorities, Des Farges v. Pugh, 93 N. C., 31; Wallace v. Cohen, 111 N. C., 103; Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U. S., 631; Stewart v. Emerson, 52 N. H., 301, presenting an elaborate and learned opinion by Associate Justice Doe; Watson v. Silsby, 166 Mass., 57. And a subsequent case in this State of Rudisill v. Whitener, 146 N. C., 403, is an approval of the principle as stated. And in Bigelow on Fraud, the author saysr “That according to the current of authority upon this subject, a debt is created by fraud, where one intending at the outset not to pay for property induces the owner to sell it to him on credit by falsely representing or causing the owner to believe that he intends to pay for it, or by concealing the intent not to pay.” It is urged for error chiefly that the charge of his Honor on the question of fraud was not sufficiently full and explicit to meet the requirements of the statute as to instructions of a trial judge. C. S., 564. It may be that his Honor did not refer to all the terms appearing in the general definition of fraud given in some of the cases on the subject, and at times required, as in suits to recover damages for fraud and deceit,, but his Honor did better in giving to the jury the law of fraud as applied to the facts of this record, which he did in accord with the principles heretofore stated, and in terms sufficiently full and clear to enable the parties to present, and the jury to intelligently consider, every phase of the evidence pertinent to the issues. “He shall state in a plain and correct manner the evidence given in the ease, and declare and explain the law arising thereon” is the language of the statute on the subject. And the charge of his Honor is in full compliance with the statutory provision. For the same reason, the exceptions noted for failure to give the special instructions requested by defendant must be overruled. *117 To tbe extent that tbey are correct, or pertinent, tbe positions were all covered by tbe general charge, and in sncb case a refusal will not be beld for reversible error. Sternburg v. Crohon, 172 N. C., 731-736; Cochran v. Smith, 171 N. C., 369. Nor is there any valid exception to tbe rulings of tbe court on questions of evidence. Tbe only one urged upon our attention was to tbe reception of evidence on part of plaintiff as to tbe value of tbe property, tbe evidence being that at tbe time of tbe trade tbe land was worth $50 per acre, or $2,500, and at tbe time of trial, $1,250. But these estimates were pertinent facts in confirmation of plaintiff’s position, and also as directly tending to impeach or weaken tbe evidence of defendant on tbe subject, who claimed and testified that tbe deed was executed to him in payment for past services to tbe amount of $200. There is no reversible error presented in tbe record, and tbe judgment for plaintiff on tbe verdict will be affirmed. No error.