State v. . Harwood

Smith, C. J —after staling the case: The inference drawn is not warranted, for, as was said in State v. Daniel, 89 N. C., 553, “the mischief which the enactment was intended to remedy was the interference of others with the servants who had thus agreed to serve by offering them inducements to depart, or with knowledge that they had so departed in disregard of their contract obligations by receiving such into their service.” So the offence consists not in abandoning the service, but enticing such as were disposed to remain to' leave and break their contracts. The contract with the infants was void only at their election, and operative as to all except privies, and hence, while subsisting, is provided against interference from others as much as if obligatory on both parties to it. It cannot be treated as a nullity by the defendant, who officiously and unlawfully interfered to induce its abandonment by the seduced infants. The mischief is as great as if the contractors were adults, and the remedy is co-extensive with the mischief provided against. Nor is the indictment defective in either of the particulars pointed out. The act, in its original form, applied to servants only by indenture, or whose contracts were in writing (Bat. Rev., ch. 70); and, to bring an offender under the denunciation of the statute, it was necessary to aver and prove that the service was by indenture, or by virtue of a written contract, since this was an essential element in the crime, and so it was held in State v. Rice, 76 N. C., 194. The phraseology has undergone a change in The Code, and the provision leaving out the word “indenture” is made to embrace every case of service under contract, “whether in writing or oral,” and hence it is sufficient to allege the contract without specifying whether it was in writing or oral. *728 Nor is it necessary to specify by what acts or words the ■enticing was effected. It is generally sufficient to charge a statutory offence in the words of the statute, and it is necessary to be specific in setting out the facts only when the statute is, in terms, too comprehensive, and this to show that the offence is embraced in it. In the indictment under a statute which prohibits the abducting, or by any means inducing, a child under fourteen years of age to leave the relative mentioned, or school where he or she may be placed, shall be guilty of a crime, &c., it was held sufficient to use the words of the statute defining the offence, nor was it needful to set out the means by which the abduction was effected. State v. George, 93 N. C., 567. Nor do we yield our assent to the argument, pressed with so much earnestness, that the statute violates any principle of the Constitution, because limited to laborers and servants. The evil consequences of such interference with that class of persons doubtless led to this limitation upon the enactment. There is no error, and the judgment is affirmed. Affirmed.