Cheatham v. . Rowland

MbreiMON, C. J.: The very purpose of arbitration and award is to settle, conclude and put an end to disputes, controversies and litigations as to matters and things constituting a cause or causes of actioix embraced by the agreement to submit them to arbitration. Hence, an award duly made, performed 'and observed, constitutes a good plea in bar of any subsequent action for the same cause. The law favors such amicable method of adjustment of controversies and will uphold and enforce, by proper means and methods, agreements to arbitrate, and' awards when so made. Patton v. Baird, 7 Ired. Eq., 255; Osborne v. Calvert, 83 N. C., 365; 2 Greenleaf on Ev., sec. 69; Kyd on Awards, 381. In this case the defendant, in his answer, pl-eads in bar of the action that the whole cause of action alleged in the com *221 plaint was, by the parties before the action began, made the subject of arbitration; that the arbitrators selected duly considered the subject so submitted to them, and made their award in. such respect, which the defendant observed and performed. It was not objected on the trial that the agreement to arbitrate or that the award was in any respect insufficient, or that it was incompetent to show, by proper evidence, that the cause of action was considered by the arbitrators and embraced by the award, but it was contended that “it was admitted in the answer* that the claim was not submitted to or passed upon by the said arbitrators, and was never presented to defendant till September 6th, 1888.” It. was insisted that such admission was conclusive upon the defendant, and the Court should not have received evidence to the contrary. If it be granted that this might be so, it is clear that the defendant did not, and did not intend to, make such admission in his answer. So much of the answer as constituted his plea in bar, alleged directly the contrary. What the plaintiff relies upon as such admission, is the simple statement that after' the arbitration he had no notice of the plaintiff’s claim, as made in opposition to the award, until the time mentioned. This seems to us to be the plain meaning of what is said in the answer, taken in connection with the plea in bar. The language used is: “He further charges that although there had been a settlement of these matters (referring to the arbitration and award), and that plaintiff was given time by the arbitrators to bring in all claims of every description he had against defendant before them, defendant never had any notice whatever of such claim until,” &c. The supposed admission was inconsistent with the express allegations of the plea. The agreement to arbitrate was broad and comprehensive, and it was not contended that it did not embrace the cause of action alleged in the complaint. It was competent for the defendant to prove that it was considered by the arbitra *222 tors and was embraced by the award. Osborn v. Calvert, supra; Brown v. Brown, 4 Jones, 123; Walker v. Walker, 1 Winst., 258. The evidence produced went directly to so prove, and there was no evidence to the contrary. The Court was fully warranted in saying that it would instruct the jury to find the first issue in the affirmative If the plaintiff intended to make one or more breaches of covenant contained in the deed of trust on the part of the defendant a' cause or causes of action in this action, he should have so alleged in his complaint. No such cause of action is alleged; the deed of trust is unnecessarily and improperly referred to, and the reference to it is merely redundant matter. Affirmed.