Stansbury v. . Guilford County

Denny, J. The judgments entered in the actions referred to in the above statement of facts and pleaded by the respective parties in this action, are not binding on the parties hereto, except as to the specific claims litigated therein. Consequently, the plaintiff has the right to pursue his claim against the defendant for alleged additional compensation, which claim was not adjudicated in the former litigation. Likewise, the defendant, for whose benefit one of the former actions 'was brought, has the right to assert its defense to plaintiff’s claim, notwithstanding the decision in such action, which, among other things, involved the same legal questions presented on this appeal. Chapter 91, Public Laws of 1927, authorizes the Board of County Commissioners in any county, to appoint a county manager. The Act provides further: “In lieu of the appointment of a county manager, the board may impose and confer upon the chairman of the board of county commissioners the duties and powers of a manager, as hereinafter set forth, and under such circumstances said chairman shall be considered a whole time chairman. Or the board may impose and confer such powers and duties upon any other officer or agent of the county who may be sufficiently qualified to perform such duties, and the compensation paid to such officer or agent may be revised or adjusted in order that it may be adequate compensation for all the duties of his office. The term 'manager’ herein used shall apply to such chairman, officer, or agent in the performance of such duties.” It will be noted that the adjustment of compensation is limited to such officer or agent as may be designated in lieu of naming a whole time chairman or county manager, an'd we think the term “manager” which shall apply to such chairman, officer or agent, in the performance of his duties, is used here to indicate the powers and duties which may be conferred upon a whole time chairman, other officer or agent who may be acting in lieu of a county manager. All the powers and duties of a county manager may-be delegated to the chairman of a Board of County Commissioners, or other officer or *46 agent of the county, but such duties must be assumed and carried out in his capacity as such chairman, officer or agent, and the mere delegation of such additional powers and duties does not create a new office. Otherwise, the question of double office holding would confront us, as pointed out in Hill v. Stansbury, 223 N. C., 193, 25 S. E. (2d), 604, citing Brigman v. Baley, 213 N. C., 119, 195 S. E., 617. No additional duties were imposed upon the plaintiff by the resolution adopted by the Board of Commissioners of Guilford County, 2 January, 1939, which purported to fix the salary of the plaintiff at $350.00 per month. The resolution contains the statement that the plaintiff had been performing the duties of a whole time chairman for two years prior thereto. Therefore, the primary purpose of the resolution was to adjust plaintiff’s compensation and not to change or enlarge his duties. It is conceded that the duties performed by the plaintiff were germane to his office, and there is no contention that the plaintiff’s services were not satisfactory or that the compensation fixed in the resolution was excessive. The challenge is solely to the authority of the Board of Commissioners of Guilford County to pay the plaintiff more than the $1,800.00 authorized by chapter 427, Public-Local Laws of 1927. Kendall v. Stafford, 178 N. C., 461, 101 S. E., 15. Conceding, but not deciding, that there is implied legislative authority for the payment of additional compensation to the plaintiff, we think the Board of Commissioners, of which plaintiff was a member, was without legal authority to increase the salary of the plaintiff in excess of that expressly fixed by statute. Hill v. Stansbury, supra; Reed v. Madison, 213 N. C., 145, 195 S. E., 620; Carolina Beach v. Mintz, 212 N. C., 578, 194 S. E., 309; Commissioners of Brunswick v. Walker, 203 N. C., 505, 166 S. E., 385; Kendall v. Stafford, supra; Borden v. Goldsboro, 173 N. C., 661, 92 S. E., 694; Snipes v. Winston, 126 N. C., 374, 35 S. E., 610. The verdict below must be reversed. As heretofore stated, the counterclaim of the defendant, pleaded herein, was adjudicated in the former action brought by Hill et al. v. Stansbury et al., on behalf of Guilford County and for its benefit. Guilford County not only ratified and approved the action of its citizens in initiating that action, but accepted the proceeds of the judgment entered therein, and became a party thereto. See Hill v. Stansbury, 224 N. C., 356, 30 S. E. (2d), 150. We think the proviso in the judgment in the former action was not intended to authorize the further adjudication of the same claims adjudicated therein, but the judgment was intended to be without prejudice to the parties, as to other claims or defenses thereto not expressly adjudicated therein, but arising out of the same factual situation. Hence, we hold that the defendant by accepting the benefits of the *47 judgment in tbe former action is estopped from asserting the counterclaim herein pleaded. The judgment of the court below is Reversed.