Patton v. Cooper.

Clark, C. J., after stating the facts. The receipts entered on docket 27 October and 27 December, 1898, unexplained would have been a satisfaction of the judgment except as to the $3 afterwards paid and entered 18 March, 1899. But the subsequent purchasers, the mortgagees of the judgment debtor, who are the plaintiffs herein, were fixed with notice of any facts appearing further upon the judgment docket or of which they were put upon inquiry by such entries. Their *794 mortgage and trust deed were not taken till April, 1900, and they found, for they properly bad the judgment docket searched, that on 23 February, 1899, the plaintiff in'the judgment bad assigned said judgment to Z. W. Nichols in trust for collection for the benefit of M. D. Cooper and W. L. Aiken without recourse. The judgment roll, if examined, would have shown that these were endorsers on the note upon which the judgment had been taken and reasonable inquiry would have elicited the fact that they were sureties, that said assignment had been made to a trustee to keep the judgment lien alive for their benefit (Rice v. Hearn, 109 N. C., 150), and that the previous receipts entered on the docket by Duck-worth, attorney for the plaintiff, had been made by inadvertence and contrary to the agreement made between the bank and said sureties, who were not responsible for Duckworth’s erroneous entry. Had the plaintiffs herein been purchasers for value or mortgagees, with no other notice than said entries of payment, they would have taken a good title. But subsequent to such entries the assignment of the judgment by the bank to a trustee for the benefit of the sureties had been entered on the docket and they took with full knowledge and were thus put on inquiry as to the nature of the payment and the relation of Cooper and Aiken to the liability. Peebles v. Gay, 115 N. C., 38; 44 Am. St. Rep., 429. Upon the facts found the injunction should have been dissolved. The judgment below is Reversed.