Kirkland v. . Deck

*440 DeviN, J. Tbe North Carolina statutes granting power of revocation of voluntary conveyances of property in trust in which there are contingent limitations over to persons not in esse, were brought forward in General Statutes as section 39-6. This statute permits the grantor in a voluntary conveyance in which some future interest in real property is conveyed or limited to a person not in esse, before such person comes into being, to revoke by deed the interest so conveyed. The statute also declares that “the grantor, maker or trustor who has heretofore created or may hereafter create a voluntary trust estate in real or personal property for the use and benefit of himself or of any other person or persons in esse with a future contingent interest to some person or persons not in eáse or not determined until -the happening of a future event, may át any time, prior to the happening of the contingency vesting the future estates, revoke the grant of the interest to such person or persons not in esse or not determined by a proper instrument to that effect.” The statute was made inapplicable to trusts thereafter created which were expressly stated to be irrevocable, and it was further provided “that this section shall not apply to any instrument heretofore executed whether or not such instrument contains express provision that it is irrevocable unless the grantor, maker or trustor shall within six months of the effective date of this proviso either revoke such future interest, or file with the trustee an instrument stating or declaring that it is his intention to retain the power to revoke under this section.” The proviso last quoted was added by Chap. 437, Session Laws 1943, which was ratified '4 March, 1943. The deed of revocation in the case at bar was executed 25 March, 1943, and recorded the following, day, within the six months period prescribed by the Act. The statute in which the several acts on the subject are codified as G. S., 39-6, was recently considered by this Court and its constitutionality, history and effect discussed in the opinion written for the Court by Justice Seawell in Pinkham v. Mercer, 227 N. C., 72, 40 S. E. (2d), 690. The statute, before the amendment of 1943, was also considered and given effect in MacMillan v. Trust Co., 221 N. C., 352, 20 S. E. (2d), 276; MacRae v. Trust Co., 199 N. C., 714, 155 S. E., 614; Stanback v. Bank, 197 N. C., 292, 148 S. E., 313. It may be noted also that the trust conveyance covering the land which is the subject of the present action was voluntary and contained no provision against revocation. The judgment of the Superior Court is Affirmed.