Blackwood v. Southern Railway Co.

Hoke,. J. On the hearing, recovery was resisted by defendant principally for the alleged reason that plaintiff did this work for his own advantage in that by keeping the mail pouches open that much longer his cancellation of stamps was increased, thereby adding to his (salary, and that the seryices for which pay is now sought were and are intended to be gratuitous. But on a perusal of the pleadings, the evidence and the charge of the court, this view has been rejected in the verdict and the facts as accepted and acted on by the jury are to'the effect: that from 1910 to 1917 plaintiff engaged in business;'was also postmaster at Carr-boro, in said county, the office being from 200 to 300 feet from the railroad station where defendant delivered the mail. That for four consecutive years'of that period plaintiff, under the impression that it was a part of his official duty, and with full knowledge of the defendant company, its agent, etc., carried the mail from the station to the office four times per day, to his great inconvenience and the interruption of his personal business. That in 1915, having ascertained that defendant company was under a contract for hire with the Government to do this work, plaintiff stopped, and since that time it has been undertaken by company, and same let out by them for pay, etc. In the case of Sanders v. Ragan, 172 N. C., 612, the Court said: “That the action of indebitatus assumpsit is dependent largely on equitable principles and in the absence of some special contract controlling this matter, and unless in contravention of some public policy, it will usually lie wherever one man has • been enriched • or the value of his estate enhanced at another’s .expense under circumstances that in equity and good conscience call for an accounting by the wrongdoer.” Citing Mitchell v. Walker, 30 N. C., 243; Keener on (Quasi-Contract, ,p. 318. *344 In application of tbe general principle, it is ordinarily true tbat in tbe absence of a special contract where one person bas rendered services of . value for tbe benefit of another, or which tbe latter is under a binding obligation to perform, and such services and tbe benefits therefrom, not intended to be gratuitous, have been knowingly accepted and received, tbe law will imply a promise to pay what such services are reasonably worth. It is said by an intelligent commentator, 15 A. E., 2d Ed., pp. 1082-83, tbat there are limitations on tbe principle, among them, tbat tbe party benefited must have tbe legal power to make a direct contract of a similar kind; and again, tbe services and benefits must have been received under circumstances tbat afforded tbe person benefited tbe opportunity to reject them, etc., but no sucb modifications are presented in tbe present case, where, as stated, it bas been made to appear tbat tbe services were performed by plaintiff under tbe impression tbat they were a part of bis official duties. That this was permitted by tbe defendant with full knowledge of attendant conditions, and further, with tbe fair and reasonable inference tbat tbe company has been compensated for this work tbat they knowingly allowed plaintiff to do, and of which they have received tbe benefits. j~ Tbe well considered case of Blowers v. So. Ry., 70 S. C., 377, seems to ■j be in direct support of tbe present recovery and several decisions of our Í own Court are in full approval of tbe principle upon which it rests. Sanders v. Ragan, supra; Blount v. Guthrie, 99 N. C., 92; Bailey v. Rutjes, 86 N. C., 517; 15 A. and E., 2d Ed., p. 1083; 40 Cyc., pp. 2810-11. We find no error in tbe record, and tbe judgment for plaintiff is affirmed. No erx*or.