Taylor v. . Sharp

Shepherd, J.: The single question presented in this appeal is whether the judgment rendered by his Honor was authorized by the facts appearing in the record. It is a general principle that all matters bearing upon the execution, the interpretation and the validity of a contract are to be determined by the law of the place where the contract is made, and if valid there, it is valid everywhere. *381 Watson v. Orr, 3 Dev., 163; Davis v. Coleman, 7 Iredell, 424; Anderson v. Doak, 10 Iredell, 295; Scudder v. Bank, 91 U. S. Rep., 406. An exception, however, is maintained by some of the continental jurists as to the capacity of a contracting party, and they generally hold that the incapacity of the domicile attaches to and follows the person wherever he may go. This is not, says Mr. Justice Story (Conflict. Laws, 103, 104), the doctrine of the common law; and Gray, C. J. (in Milliken v. Pratt, 105 Mass., 374), after an elaborate examination of the question, concludes that the general current of English and American authorities is in favor of holding that a contract, which by the law of the place is recognized as lawfully made by a capable person, is valid everywhere, although the person would not, under the law of the domicile, be deemed capable of making it. This principle has been doubted in the case of a married woman where her contract, made in another State, is sought to be enforced in the State of her domicile, where by the laws of such State she is under a complete common law disability to make any contract whatever. The question, however, does not arise in the present case, as there is nothing to show that the feme defendant was domiciled in this State at the time of the execution of the contract sued upon. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the law presumes that she was, at the date of the contract, a resident of the State where it was made. ! The contract was executed in New York, and under the laws of that State (Acts 1884) a married woman may contract as if she were jeme sole, -except where the contract is made with her husband. This contract was not made with her husband within the meaning of the act above mentioned (Bank v. Sniffin, 7 N. Y. S., 520), and was, therefore, valid where made. It is well settled that our Courts will entertain personal actions between citizens of other States where jurisdiction *382 has been, obtained by service of process within our limits (The Code, §192), and we are unable to see how the defendant by a mere change of residence can rid herself of liability upon the contract in question. 2 Parsons Cont., 57G. We have very carefulty examined the authorities cited by the defendant’s counsel, but they fail to convince us that in sustaining the judgment we are contravening any well settled public policy in this State in reference to the laws of married women. Many phases of the general subject (not free from difficulty) were presented by the counsel, but we have purposely abstained from their discussion, as they are not directly presented by the record. We simply decide that we are of the opinion that this particular judgment should be affirmed. Affirmed.