State v. . Gupton

Walkeb, J., after stating the ease: The rejection of evidence and the instruction given to the jury, that there was no evidence offered of self-defense, were erroneous. They were based upon the mistaken view that the complaint and warrant were void, as no criminal offense was stated in them. The complaint charges that an unlawful and willful assault had been committed by Charlie Snyder, who was afterwards killed by the prisoner. The accusation is not expressed in very formal or technical language, but it is sufficient to show that a crime had been committed by Snyder.- If he had appeared to answer the charge, he could have required that the offense be stated with greater particularity, so that he could know how to defend himself (Revisal, sec. 1467; S. v. Pool, 106 N. C., 698); but this he did *262 not do. Tbe justice could bare amended tbe proceedings of bis own motion, under tbat section. Tbis contemplates, of course, tbat magistrates, not learned in tbe law, may sometimes issue papers defective in form, and even in substance, but tbe method of correction is provided by tbe statute. An unlawful assault is a crime, and though not stated in tbe complaint and warrant with technical accuracy, tbis does not invalidate tbe warrant. It is but a defective statement, being too general; but tbe nature of tbe crime sufficiently' appears for tbe purpose of tbe arrest and tbe justification of tbe officer in making it. Tbe affidavit and warrant must be read together, and so construed. S. v. Davis, 111 N. C., 729; S. v. Wilson, 106 N. C., 718. It is not expected nor required, in tbe absence of special provision to tbe contrary, tbat an affidavit or complaint should be in any particular form, or should charge tbe crime with tbe fullness or particularity necessary in' an information or indictment. 12 Cyc., 294. But it is useless to emphasize tbe error in tbe ruling of tbe court by argument. Tbis Court has held in a similar case tbat such a warrant confers lawful authority upon tbe-officer to arrest tbe accused. S. v. Jones, 88 N. C., 671. Tbe warrant in tbat case was for larceny, and tbe word “feloniously” was not used in describing tbe offense, nor was tbe ownership of tbe property alleged. In tbe last particular it is closely analogous to tbis case. Here tbe name of tbe person upon whom tbe assault was made was not stated. Tbe Court there held tbat while tbe defects would have been fatal in an indictment for tbe larceny, tbe law in tbe case of warrants does not require tbe same certainty or particularity as in tbe formal charge by a grand jury, and one reason for tbis is tbat in tbe latter case tbe prisoner is entitled to be informed, of tbe accusation against him •in such manner tbat be may be enabled to make bis defense. Tbe Court concluded, therefore, tbat although a warrant may be defective in form, or not striptly legal, if it is issued for a crime within tbe jurisdiction of tbe justice, tbe officer to whom •it is directed, if a regular one who is bound to obey it, or if a special one who, though not bound to obey it, undertakes to *263 execute it, is protected equally, iu both instances, by it. And for tbis statement of the law we have the authority of 1 Hale Pleas of the Crown, 460, “that although the warrant of the justice be not in strictness lawful, as if it express not the cause particularly enough, yet if the matter be within his jurisdiction as a justice of the peace, the killing of such officer, in execution of his warrant, is murder; for in such case the officer cannot dispute the validity of the warrant.” This passage from Hale was cited with approval in Boyd’s case, 17 Ga., 194, with this comment: “If this be law — and who will doubt its reasonableness? — it is decisive of this exception. It would be monstrous to lay down a different rule. It would put in jeopardy the life of every officer in the land. It never could be intended that they should determine, at their peril, the strict legal sufficiency of every precept placed in their hands.” This view is also supported by Mackalley’s case, Croke, James, 280 (9 Coke Rep., 117), wherein it was decided by all the judges, assembled in conference to resolve upon what the law was upon the record, amongst other things, that if there be error in awarding process, or in the mistake of one process for another, and an officer be slain in the execution thereof, the offender shall not have the advantage of such error, but that the resisting and staying of the officer, when he comes to make an arrest in the king’s name, is murder. See, also, Rex v. Croker, 2 Chitty, 138; King v. Wilkes, 2 Wet. Rep., 151; 2 Hale P. C., 111; Chitty’s Cr. Law, 41, and 2 McLain’s Cr. Law, sec. 922, where the subject is carefully discussed, with a full citation of the authorities. There are other considerations favoring the validity of the complaint and warrant, so far as their protection to the officer in making the arrest is concerned, but they need not be mentioned. The deceased mistook his remedy. He should have submitted to the arrest, and asserted his right to a better warrant at the hearing, instead of defying the officer and assuming a hostile attitude towards him, endangering his life by the use of a deadly weapon, and actually encouraging his wife to attack him *264 with, a pistol, with which, acting in concert with her husband, she severely wounded him. He could not, in this way, take the law into his own hands and become the aggressor. The evidence as to the complaint and warrant should have been admitted. If this had been done, under the peremptory charge of - the judge, we would be compelled here to interpret the evidence in the most favorable light for the prisoner. When thus viewed — he not being deprived of the legal right to defend himself because of any mere formal defect in the complaint and warrant, by reason of the generality of the charge, if it can be seen that an offense is alleged- — -it becomes apparent that the evidence should have been received and the case submitted to the jury, so -as to give the prisoner the full benefit of the principle of self-defense, with proper instructions bearing upon that feature of the case. Whether he acted strictly in self-defense, or used excessive force or violence, are questions for the jury, who should be guided, of course, by directions of the court as to the law. He must be judged by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time, the jurors being the judges of the reasonableness of his apprehension that he was about to be killed or to receive great bodily harm. S. v. Barrett, 132 N. C., 1005. The exception of the prisoner to the rejection of the evidence, as above indicated, was well taken, and must be sustained. The reference in the charge to the insufficiency of the complaint and warrant was also objectionable. Other errors are assigned, but they need not be considered. New trial.