Finger v. . Goode

HoKe, J. In tbe recent case of Gilbert v. Shingle Co., 167 N. C., pp. 286-288, it is said to be tbe accepted rule of construction of written contracts: “Tbat tbe intent of tbe parties as embodied in tbe entire instrument should prevail, and tbat each and every part shall be given effect if it can be done by fair and reasonable intenlment, and tbat in ascertaining this intent resort should be bad, primarily, to tbe language they have employed, and where this language expresses plainly, clearly, and distinctly tbe meaning of tbe parties, it must be given effect by tbe courts, and other means of interpretation are not permissible,” citing McCallum v. McCollum, post, 310; Kearney v. Vann, 154 N. C., 311; Hendricks v. Furniture Co., 156 N. C., 569; Bridgers v. Ormond, 153 N. C., 114; Davis v. Frazier, 150 N. C., 447; Walker v. Venters, 148 N. C., 388. In tbe present case tbe contract contains express stipulation tbat “If tbe said J. A. Goode shall sell and convey any or all of tbe land herein mentioned and described, tbe contract shall at once become null and void,” and there is nothing anywhere in tbe instrument to indicate tbat tbe force and effect of this provision shall be restricted to tbe period of time tbat might elapse before operations were commenced; indeed, there is nothing to indicate tbat there was to be any such period. Tbe plain and natural meaning of tbe language is tbat tbe stipulation is to prevail through tbe life of the contract, and, applying tbe principle of interpretation above referred to, we concur in bis Honor’s view tbat, on sale of tbe land or any part of it, tbe contract obligations of tbe parties, concerning tbe portion sold, should cease. There is no error, and tbe judgment of tbe Court below is Affirmed.