Hurley v. . Ray

*379 AlleN, J. The authorities fully sustaiu the position that to constitute a valid mortgage upon a crop there must be some designation of the land upon which the crop is to be cultivated (Atkinson v. Graves, 91 N. C., 99; Rountree v. Britt, 94 N. C., 106; S. v. Garris, 98 N. C., 737; Harris v. Allen, 104 N. C., 87), and that a conveyance of the crops on lands described, and on any other lands the mortgagor may cultivate, is effective as to the crops on the lands described and void as to other crops (Gwathney v. Ethridge, 99 N. C., 571; Weil v. Flowers, 109 N. C., 217; Perry v. Bragg, 109 N. C., 304; Crinkley v. Edgerton, 113 N. C., 146). It has also been held that the crop cultivated next after the execution of the mortgage may be conveyed, and no other (Wooten v. Hill, 98 N. C., 49; Smith v. Coor, 104 N. C., 139), and that when the mortgage conveys a crop to secure a note due in the fall of the year after its execution, that the inference is unmistakable that the crop of that year is referred to and conveyed. Taylor v. Hodges, 105 N. C., 344. ¥e see no substantial difference between the language, “any other crops he may cultivate,” and that of “any other crop he may tend,” and if the description in the mortgage to the plaintiffs stopped here, we would follow the ruling of his Honor, but there are other and apt words of description, to wit, “25 acres joining Hamp Baldwin and Jim Bennett,” which will not necessarily fail because of the statement that it was the land of the mortgagor or land bought from J. C. Currie. In Proctor v. Pool, 15 N. C., 373, Chief Justice Ruffin, speaking of inconsistent descriptions in a deed, says: “It is a general rule, that if the description be so vague or contradictory that it cannot be told what thing in particular is meant, the deed is void. But it is also a general rule, that the deed shall be supported, if possible; and if by any means different descriptions can be reconciled, they shall be, or, if they be irreconcilable, yet if one of them sufficiently points out the thing, so as to render it certain that it was the one intended, a false or mistaken reference to another particular shall not overrule that which is already rendered certain. Attempts have been made to establish artificial rules for discovering the intention, and the *380 offices of terms of general and particular description defined. The truth is, no positive rule can be laid down, for as each subject differs in some respects from another, and each writer will be more or less precise or perspicuous in expressing himself, the whole instrument is to be looked at, and the inquiry then made, Can it be found out from this what the party means? In some cases it is clear that only that thing is meant in which all the particulars of the description concur. In others, the description may be by several particulars, and distinct things are found, of which one answers to the description and another to the other. It would seem in such case that the conveyance would be inoperative, because it was intended to pass one only, and it cannot be determined which one; though there is most respectable authority that both should pass, rather than neither. Worthington v. Hylyer, 4 Mass., 196. But there seems to be no danger of mistaking the intention of the parties when the thing is given by a particular name, by which it is well known, or by any other description which completely identifies it, although another particular be added, which does not apply, it is true, to the thing as before described, but is equally inapplicable to anything else. In such case the effect of the true description ought not to be weakened by a further and unnecessary description which is false,” and this has been approved in Shaffer v. Hahn, 111 N. C., 1, and in Peebles v. Graham, 128 N. C., 227. Applying this principle, we- are of opinion there was evidence which entitled the plaintiffs to have their cause submitted to the jury, upon the question of the ownership by them of the crops raised on other land than the 12 acres set apart to the defendant Bay, and that they are the owners if the jury shall find that the crops were grown on land adjoining Baldwin and Bennett, and that it was the intention of the parties to convey these to the plaintiffs. The crop in controversy is that of 1911. The defendant Bay entered into possession of the land under a parol agreement with the owner to sell him 12 acres of a larger tract, not designated or described, and to be selected thereafter, and the evidence of the plaintiffs tends to prove that he cultivated more *381 than 12 acres in one lot of land, adjoining tbe lands of Hamp Baldwin and Jim Bennett, and that the 12 acres were not set apart until after the crops were seized in this action. As the contract with the owner was in parol, Ray did not own any land, nor had he bought any from the owner, as none had been set apart or selected, and his house and premises were on all the land cultivated by him, as well as on the 12 acres after-wards allotted. It follows, therefore, that there was error, and a new trial is ordered. New trial.