Crisp v. Nantahala Power & Light Co.

*49 ClaeKSON, J. Under “Eminent Domain,” chapter 33, C. S., 1706, is the following: “The right of eminent domain may, under, the provisions of this chapter, be exercised for the purpose of constructing their roads, canals, lines of wires, or other works, which are authorized by law and which involve a public use or benefit, by the bodies politic, corporations, or persons following: . . . (3) Persons operating or desiring to operate electric light plants, for the purpose of constructing and erecting wire or other necessary things.” Under said chapter the procedure for condemnation of land for public purposes is provided for. The defendant had a right, under the above law, to condemn plaintiffs’ land, and the issues in such a case are set forth in Light Co. v. Reeves, 198 N. C., at p. 409. Instead of pursuing the orderly procedure provided by law, defendant went on plaintiffs’ land without their permission and erected its poles and transmission lines, contrary to all law. Plaintiffs sued for this wrong and defendant in its answer says that “This defendant stands ready and willing to pay to them such permanent damage as they may have sustained by reason of the construction, maintenance, and use of said transmission line.” The court below tendered other issues and also issue 6, which is as. follows: “If so, what permanent damage or compensation are plaintiffs entitled to recover of the defendant by reason thereof?” The defendant tendered a sole issue, practically as above, relating to compensation or permanent damage. The jury under this issue assessed the permanent damage as $1,000. The jury answered the third issue that defendant’s entry was wilful, wanton and wrongful, but assessed no damage against defendant for its wanton and wilful conduct as found by the jury; therefore, all exceptions and assignments of error in regard to the evidence and charge of the court below on this aspect becomes immaterial and not necessary to be considered on this appeal. The defendant contends that several witnesses were allowed to give their opinion as to the purpose for which the lands are adapted or suitable and to give an opinion of its decreased value. We see no objection to the competency of this character of evidence. Brown v. Power Co., 140 N. C., 333, is similar to the case at bar. At page 341-2, it is said: “It is well settled that when, for the purpose of meeting and providing for a public necessity, the citizen is compelled to sell his property or permit it to be subjected to a temporary or permanent burden, he is entitled by way of compensation, to its. actual market value. Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 478. The difficulty arises not so much in fixing the standard of the right, as in ascertaining what elements or factors may be shown in applying the standard. Certainly where by compulsory process and for the public good the *50 State invades and takes the property of its citizens, in the exercise of its highest prerogative in respect to property, it should pay to him full compensation. The highest authorities are to that effect. ‘The market value of property is the price which it will bring when it is offered for sale by one who desires but is not obliged to sell it, and is bought by one who is under no necessity of having it. In estimating its value all the capabilities of the property and all the uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted may be considered and not merely the condition it is in at the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner.’ Lewis Eminent Domain, supra.” This principle is also set forth in the citations made by defendant in R. R. v. Mfg. Co., 169 N. C., 164, and under chapter on Eminent Domain, 10 R. C. L., p. 130. Also the question of damage by private property being taken for public purposes is fully discussed in Ayden v. Lancaster, 195 N. C., 297. All these authorities are to the effect, as set forth in R. R. v. Mfg. Co., supra. “But mere possible or imaginary uses or the speculative scheme of its proprietor are to be excluded.” The defendant contends that some of the transmission poles were on the right-of-way of the railroad company, but the fee-simple title being in plaintiff the law is set forth in Rouse v. Kinston, 188 N. C., at p. 11, as follows: “In the present case the defendant denies the right of plaintiff to recover damages for the pipe line running along the State Highway, No. 10, plaintiff having a fee-simple title to the land. In Teeter v. Tel. Co., 172 N. C., 785, it is said: ‘It is not denied by defendant that the telegraph line superimposed upon a railroad right-of-way is aii additional burden which entitled the owner to compensation. Hodges v. Tel. Co., 133 N. C., 225; Phillips v. Tel. Co., 130 N. C., 513.’ To the same effect is a water main.” The evidence covered a wide range, but we do not think it was so remote, conjectural or speculative that we could hold it, if error, reversible or prejudicial. Ve think the evidence that the power line over the property carried 66,000 volts, a circumstance to be considered by the jury. R. R. v. Mfg. Co., 169 N. C., 156. In Greensboro v. Bishop, 197 N. C., at p. 754, it is said: “In this character of evidence (value standards) no ironclad rule can be laid down. The relevancy is largely with the court below, the probative force is for the jury.” The right-of-way taken by defendant company was 50 feet from the center of the transmission line on both sides. The line ran 1,200 feet from the point where it entered plaintiffs’ land to the point where it left it. On the entire record we see no reversible or prejudicial error. No error.