Tillery v. . Wrenn

Smith, C. J., after stating the.case. The gravamen of the complaint, and'the ground upon which the interposition of the court is asked, are the imposition of this large additional burden of indebtedness, for the sole consideration of delay and submitted to from the necessitous circumstances of the plaintiffs, by one who occupied towards them, at the time, *220 a relation very similar to that subsisting between mortgagee and mortgagor, of which position the creditor took an unreasonable advantage and should not be allowed to avail himself. A court of equity will not relieve against a contract voluntarily entered into, and not superinduced by misrepresentation or oppression, though its terms may be very onerous, where the parties deal on equal terms, and there are no confidential relations from which an undue influence may be inferred. Those who make bargains must ordinarily abide by them, for the court will not interfere with the enforcement of contracts, because of their consequences, unless the inequality of the contracting parties is such as to give one of them the opportunity of dictating to the other his own terms, and the contract itself is so unreasonable as to indicate that the power was exercised in bringing about its execution, involving duress. Potter v. Everitt, 7 Ired. Eq., 152. In Futrill v. Futrill, 5 Jones Eq., 61, the court declare it to be “ a great principle of public policy, that without any proof of actual fraud, such conveyances obtained by one whose position gave him power and influence over the other, should not stand at all if entirely voluntary, or should stand only as a security for what was actually paid or advanced upon them, where there was a partial consideration.” This is repeated and re-affirmed m Hartly v. Estis, Phil. Eq., 167, and McLeod v. Bullard, ante, 210. We do not mean to say that the plaintiffs are entitled to be exonerated from that portion of the debt embraced in the injunction order, nor to pass upon the merits of the controversy at this preliminary stage of the suit; but to annul the order would be virtually to decide the cause, since the relief sought of a perpetual injunction would become impossible if the land has been already sold, and would be confined to a return of the proceeds wrongfully applied. The plaintiffs under the interlocutory order, must *221 pay their original debt to avoid a sale, and if this is done the property becomes a much greater security for the part in dispute. The defendant, Wrenn, is not damaged, nor his interests affected, except by the delay, as to this portion of his claim, if adjudged to be entitled to it, and for this the large interest it bears affords ample compensation. As was remarked in a late case: “ Nor will the court upon an interlocutory application pass upon the merits of the controversy, but leave them to be determined upon the final hearing." Morris v. Willard, 84 N. C., 293, and cases cited in the opinion. While the postponement of the sale for the disputed portion of the debt cannot injuriously affect the creditor, the enforcement of it under the deed in trust may inflict irreparable damage upon the plaintiffs, should they ultimately prevail in the suit. Under these circumstances, we think the modified injunction was entirely proper, and the judgment appealed from must be affirmed. Let this be certified. No error. Affirmed.