Harris v. . Jones

Ashe, J. The record in this case presents three questions for the consideration of this court. 1. Are tire words “.conveys a lien upon each and every of said crops to be cultivated and made upon the said land or farm during the year ” used in the deed, executed by the said Bishop to Moliie Bardin, sufficient to create a mortgage? 2. Can a mortgage be given upon an unplanted crop ? 3. Was Craven the proper county for the registration of the mortgage? Upon the first point we are of opinion the language used in the deed is sufficient to constitute a mortgage. “No particular form is necessary to constitute a mortgage,” so the words of the deed clearly indicate the creation of a lien, specify the debt to secure which it is given, and upon the satisfaction of which the lien is to be discharged, and the property upon which it is to take effect. Jones on Mortgages, 60; In McAffrey v. Wood, 65 N. Y., 459, it is held “ no special form of words is necessary to constitute a mortgage. The statement that the creditor is to have a lien, and that on default he may take possession and sell in the same manner as in cases of chattel mortgage, sufficiently discloses the intent.” In the case of DeLeon v. Hegun, 15 Cal., 483, it was decided by the supreme court of that state “that no particular words are necessary to create a mortgage. The word^ we mortgage the property when accompanied by a provision for the sale of it in case the money recited in the instrument *322 as being thus secured, be not paid, are clearly sufficient. And in Langdon v. Bull, 9 Wendell Rep., 80, where the action was founded upon an instrument which ran thus: “ Now therefore for the payment of said notes, I hereby, pledge and give a lien on the said engine to the said Langdon, and in case the notes are not paid, hereby consent that Langdon shall hold the same as security and see himself harmless, it being understood .that I keep possession of the :same until the time comes for the payment of the notes, .and in case they are not paid, Langdon may take the same It was held, that this instrument contained all the essential .attributes of a mortgage of personal property. In our case, the instrument not only conveys a lien on the property to secure the defendant, but gives the power to the vendee, in the event of a failure to meet the payment at maturity, to take possession and sell. These provisions clearly constitute it a good chattel mortgage. As to the second point, whether an unplanted crop is the ¡subject of a mortgage: That question has been expressly decided in the affirmative at this term of the court in the case of Cotten v. Willoughby, ante 75, and it is unnecessary to add any authorities to those there cited. As to the remaining question, whether Craven was the proper couniy for the registration of the mortgage we are of opinion the registration in that county is sufficient, upon the authority of Simpson v. Morris, 3 Jones, 411. In our case the mortgage was executed on December the 11th, 1877, and registered in Craven county December the 28th, 1877, and at the time of the execution of the mortgage, Bishop was residing in Jones county, but had purchased the farm on which the crop was to be made and was •in the act of removing to it, and had moved some of his personal property, and was only prevented from removing .his family and the remainder of his personal effects, by the the refusal of the lessee of the premises to sui’render the *323 possession before the first of January. But he did not-move •on the first of January, and lived upon the farm in Craven county, upon which 'the cotton in question was raised, during the year 1878. In the case of Simpson v. Morris, supra, the 'plaintiff liad purchased some slaves from David Simpson and took a bill of sale for the same. They both resided in Union county when the bill of.sale was executed, and the slaves were sent soon after the purchase to the county of Mecklenburg, where the plaintiff owned a plantation on which the slaves were kept until the plaintiff removed to the same place, and his father David Simpson, near there. -The bill of sale was proved and registered in the county of Mecklenburg, and on the trial of the cause, the defendant objected to its reception as'evidence, because, as he insisted, it should have been registered in the county where it was executed and where both parties resided at the time of its execution. ‘Chief Justice Nash who delivered the opinion of this court" held the registration sufficient. “One object,” he'said, “of ‘the registration act is to-furnish those who deal with the owners of slaves a ready way of ascertaining their title to them. Another is to ascertain where slaves are to be given in under the revenue laws. The purchaser, the plaintiff, residing in Mecklenburg county, -and the slaves being there, would naturally search the register’s office of that count to ascertain his title.” So in our case a creditor of Bishop proposing to take-a lien on h.is crop for supplies to be furnished-, or a mortgage to secure a debt in the .year 1878, would hardly have -looked to the registry of Jones county for in-cumbrances on his crop to be raised on his farm in Craven county, but would naturally have searched the register’s office in the latter county where he resided and where the crop was to be made. The cases are analogous. Bills of sale of slaves were required to be registered in the county where 'the purchaser-resided, when he took the actual .posses *324 sion of the slaves, Rev. Code, ch. 37, § 20, and chattel mortgages in the county where the mortgagor resided. Bat.Rev., ch. 35, § 12. The registration of the mortgage we think was sufficient. If it is-not within the letter, it comes within the spirit of the act. There is error and the judgment of the superior court is reversed. Error- . Reversed,