Buckner v. . C. I. T. Corporation

*699 Adams, J". Tbe plaintiff recovered a judgment for tbe cancellation of bis note and of tbe retained title contract and for tbe delivery to bim of tbe unencumbered title to tbe sedan. It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether tbe appllant’s exceptions present good cause for a new trial or a reversal or modification of tbe judgment. Tbe receipt referred to in tbe statement of facts recites tbe plaintiff’s payment to Asheville Overland-Knight, Inc., of $540 “for C. I. T.' Corporation.” Tbe appellant excepted for tbe assigned reason that this recital is a declaration of agency made by tbe agent and was inadmissible at least until agency bad been established prima facie by other evidence. Tbe declarations of an alleged agent, whether written or verbal, are, of course, incompetent to prove agency. Realty Co. v. Rumbough, 172 N. C., 741; Arndt v. Insurance Co., 176 N. C., 652. But tbe order in which evidence may be introduced is a matter within tbe discretion of tbe judge unless it is obvious that prejudice may result; and as evidence of agency was afterwards offered without objection, we do not see bow tbe defendant was prejudiced by tbe receipt. Tbe fourth exception presents tbe same question. Several exceptions were taken to evidence tending to show that for some years Asheville Overland-Knight, Inc., bad regularly collected money from its customers for tbe defendant. From tbe testimony it was permissible to draw tbe conclusion that an agreement to this effect bad been made by tbe two companies and that Asheville Overland-Knight, Inc., was, as tbe plaintiff contended, an agent for tbe collection of tbe note assigned by it to tbe defendant. We find no error in tbe court’s refusal to dismiss tbe action or in tbe instruction given tbe jury. All tbe evidence for tbe plaintiff tended to show agency, and tbe only evidence introduced by tbe defendant was tbe retained title contract and certain paragraphs in tbe pleadings. No error.