Connecticut General Life Insurance v. Skurkay

Brogden, J. The contract of insurance was made in Pennsylvania, and must be interpreted in accordance with the law of that State. Cannaday v. R. R., 143 N. C., 439, 55 S. E., 836; Hall v. Tel. Co., 139 N. C., 369, 52 S. E., 50; Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, 198 N. C., 397, 151 S. E., 857. Consequently, in undertaking to interpret and apply the law of Pennsylvania, this Court is somewhat in the position of an innocent by-stander. In arriving at the meaning and applicability of the Pennsylvania laws and decisions, the plaintiff offered as a witness an eminent attorney of that State and a graduate of the University of Pittsburgh Law School, who testified in substance that the answer to question No. -27 considered in the light of pertinent Pennsylvania decisions, was material as a matter of law. The defendant offered an eminent member of the Pennsylvania bar, also a graduate of the University of Pittsburgh Law School, who testified that the materiality of the question should be submitted to the jury, and further, that the knowledge of the agent, Koontz, was imputable to the plaintiff and constituted an estoppel. These eminent experts cite and rely upon the same Pennsylvania cases to support their conclusions. In other words, two legal experts, graduates of the same law school, and practicing in the same state, cite the same opinions, but draw conclusions therefrom as far apart as zenith and nadir. However, both parties cite the case of Koppleman v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Company, 302 Pa., 106, 153 Atl., 121. This decision was rendered in 1930, and is one of the latest decisions upon the pertinent principles of law. Quoting from the March case, 186 Pa., 629, 40 Atl., 1100, the Pennsylvania Court said: “Misrepresentation or untrue statement in an application, if made in good faith, shall not avoid the policy unless it relate to some matter material to the risk. If it does relate to such matter, the act is inapplicable. If the matter is not material to the risk, and the statement is made in good faith, although it is untrue, it shall not avoid the policy. . . . Ordinarily questions of good faith and materiality are for the jury, and where the materiality of a statement to the risk involved is itself of a doubtful character, its *232 determination should be submitted to the jury. But it was never intended by the- act of 1885, nor did that act assume to change the law in cases where the matter stated was palpably and manifestly material to the risk, or where it was absolutely and visibly false in fact.” The Koppleman case is an illuminating utterance and assembles, discusses and distinguishes various decisions in Pennsylvania upon a variety.of false statements or representations in application for insurance. Summarizing the governing principle the Court said: “In the instant case,' the proof is not only undisputed, but it comes from the plaintiff himself. Under such conditions, whether it be a representation or warranty, if the statement made is material and admittedly untrue, there can be no recovery on the policy.” The same general view of the Pennsylvania law is declared by the District Court of Pennsylvania in Zeidel v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, 44 Fed. (2d), 843. The .March case, supra, holds specifically that existing insurance in another company at the time of an application is material as a matter of law. The Court said: “In respect to the first class of questions above enumerated, in which the materiality of them was submitted to the jury, we are clearly of the opinion that they were all material, and that the jury should have been so instructed.” See, also, Leadman v. Ælna Life Ins. Co., 163 S. E., 716, and Southern, Surety Company of New York v. Forlson, 161 S. E., 679. The Fortson case, supra, involved a false statement as to the amount of disability insurance carried by the applicant. In the case at bar the defendant, a skilled and intelligent man, wrote the answers to the questions in the application himself. The answer to question 27, so written by him, was false. He solemnly agrees “that all the foregoing statements and answers as written are true.” Manifestly the amount of disability benefit carried by an applicant would enter into a determination of the advisability of the risk. If the agent had written the answers in the application, the doctrine of estoppel announced in Evans v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 294 Pa., 406, would doubtless apply; but the defendant, the sole and exclusive author of the statements in the application, furnished material information to the plaintiff, which, in the language of the Pennsylvania Court, “was absolutely and visibly false in fact.” Therefore, as we interpret the Pennsylvania decisions, the plaintiff was entitled to have the trial judge give the following instructions duly requested: (a) “The court has charged you that the policy in controversy contained additional provision ‘Gr,’ and the court charges you that under the law of Pennsylvania the answer to question 27 in the application is a warranty, and that a warranty cannot be waived by an agent such as solicited the policy in this case. The evidence is not disputed that the *233 answer to question 27 is false, and being a warranty as explained, it is your duty to answer tbe issues in favor of tbe plaintiff.”’ (b) “That under the facts in tbis case and all tbe evidence, tbe court instructs you tbat under tbe law of Pennsylvania question No. 27 was material to tbe risk, and you will answer tbe third issue 'Tes.’ ” Tbe exceptions of tbe plaintiff to tbe failure of tbe trial court to give tbe foregoing instructions is sustained. Reversed.