Stevens v. Southern Railway Co.

Adams, J. The first six exceptions are addressed to the admission of evidence tending to show the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. These injuries are described in the complaint, not for the purpose of stating a cause of action, but of showing both the reasonableness of the contract relied on and the circumstances under which it was made. The plaintiff alleges that he filed no claim for damages because *530 be was assured by the company, tbrougb whose negligence be bad been injured, tbat in consideration of bis waiver be should have employment as long as be lived, and the evidence excepted to was properly admitted as tending to show the consideration upon which the agreement was made, and it was no doubt so understood by the jury. It has been held tbat contracts of this character are not against public policy or incapable of enforcement on the ground of indefiniteness merely because the exact period of service is not specified. Hence the courts have sustained contracts by employers to give to servants injured by their negligence “steady and permanent” employment, or employment “as long as the company’s works are running,” or “so long as the business of a corporation continues,” or during the life of the employee, or to give “a living wage required for the support of the employee and bis family.” As we have indicated, it cannot be said tbat the contract' between the plaintiff and the" railroad was without consideration. They entered into a compromise and adjustment of the plaintiff’s claim for damages, and “such adjustment will afford a sufficient consideration for the agreement whether the agreement was well founded or not.” Fisher v. Lumber Co., 183 N. C., 485; Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan, 6 Ind. App., 109; Lead Co. v. Kinlin, 47 Neb., 409; McMullen v. Dickinson Co., 63 Minn., 405; Carnig v. Carr, 35 L. R. A. (Mass.), 512; Texas C. R. Co. v. Eldridge, 155 S. W. (Texas), 1010; Cox. v. Railroad, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) (Ind.), 453 and note. See, also, Rhyne v. Rhyne, 151 N. C., 400; Re Estate of McVicker, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1112. These propositions, as we understand, are not seriously disputed, but it is insisted tbat the contract was made, if at all, with the Richmond and Danville Railroad, and is therefore not binding on the defendant. We are not inadvertent to authorities holding that executory contracts for personal services involving a personal relation or confidence between the parties cannot be assigned (R. R. v. R. R., 147 N, C., 368), but in our opinion the disposition of the present appeal is not dependent upon a decision of this question. There was evidence tending to show that the contract had been duly executed on- the part of the Richmond and Danville Railroad Company by three men, including Captain Green, the superintendent, who was afterwards superintendent of the defendant; that the defendant was formed by the combination of the Richmond and Danville Railroad and other roads, and that when the consolidation was concluded the Richmond and Danville Railroad was “one of the constituent elements of the Southern”; that after the combination sonie of the former officers continued in the service of the defendant, and that the plaintiff had been awarded a bronze medal bearing the two inscriptions, “Sam Stevens, 1879 to 1916” and “Southern Railway Company for Loyalty.” These and other circumstances appearing from *531 tbe evidence were sufficient to create a reasonable inference tbat tbe defendant, witb knowledge of tbe contract, continued tbe plaintiff’s employment and recognized and ratified tbe agreement, under wbicb tbe compromise was effected and tbe service rendered and accepted. There was no exception to tbe charge, and we must presume tbat all material and substantive phases of tbe evidence were properly submitted to tbe jury. Todd v. Machis, 160 N. C., 352; Brown v. Brown, 182 N. C., 42; S. v. Jones, 182 N. C., 781. After a careful examination of tbe record we find no reversible error.' No error.