W. M. Sanders v. John Earp.

*277 Montgomery, J.: Before the Revenue Act of 1887 the laws put upon the purchasers of lauds at tax sales, who claimed by deed from the sheriff, the burden of proving the regularity of most of the proceedings under which the sales wer'emade, and especially that part of the proceedings which required of the sheriff to give notice of the intended sale to the person who held the legal title to the land. The act above referred to reversed the whole spirit of our laws in respect to the sale of land for taxes and made either a presumption of entire regularity in favor of the purchaser, or declared errors and mistakes mere irregularities, from the levying of the taxes by the commissioners to the sale of the property, including the sheriff’s deed, if the taxes were lawful and there was no fraud in the sale, dr unless the taxes had been paid and erroneously entered by the sheriff on his books as a credit to another person for his taxes. However, in the Act of 1887 there was a most important and salutary provision which has been omitted in all the subsequent revenue acts. Section 69 of that act in substance provides that the purchaser of lands at tax sales, or his assignee, shall, three months before the expiration of the time of redemption, serve a written or printed notice of his purchase on the person in the actual possession of the land, and also on the person in whose name the land was assessed; and in the notice he shall give the date of his purchase, the name of the person in whom the land was assessed, a description of the same, for what year the tax was assessed, and when the time of redemption will end. Section 70 of the act required that, the purchaser, before he could demand a deed from the sheriff, should make affidavit that he had given the notice required by Section 69. The affidavit was to be filed by the sheriff in the office of the register of deeds, and was to be only prima facie evidence that such notice had been given; *278 and false swearing in this respect was made perjury. In Section 82 of the act, this failure to give notice is excepted from the list of irregularities in the proceedings, which are deemed mere irregularities under that act. It is difficult to understand why such a just and whole some provision of the Act of 1887 has not since that time been brought forward as a part of the revenue law of the state. The 'present case was submitted to the court below under Section 567 of The Gode. It is agreed in the case that all of the proceedings are regular, except that the sheriff gave no notice of the sale by mail to the defendant. The only question in the case is, was the failure of the sheriff to give notice by mail to the tax payer of the sale of land for taxes fatal to the deed from the sheriff to the plaintiff? The law is plainly written that such notice, while required in the statute, is declared in the same to be a mere irregularity so far as the purchaser is concerned. The plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the land. It appears that a tract of land of 159 acres had been sold for taxes and that the purchaser had no notice of the sale, except that of a general advertisement in a newspaper, probably with many other sales in the same advertisement. If the constitutional limitation in respect to taxation is considered, it will be seen that the taxes levied on this land could have been only a few dollars — the amount the purchaser probably was not anxious to see stated in the case submitted. It is a hard case, but probably the defendant is not without a remedy. Because the revenue law, while providing for the notice, declares that the notice is only directory and the want of it a mere irregularity as to the purchaser, it does not follow that the sheriff or tax collector can neglect to perform his part of the requirements of the law with impunity. If he knew where the post office of the defend *279 ant was, or with reasonable diligence could have learned of it, and did not give the notice, he can .probably be made to respond in damages to the value of the land to the defendant for his failure to discharge his duty. The principle laid down in State v. Hatch, 116 N. C., 1003, is another of the healthy stimulants applied by the law to force neglectful public officers to the performance of their reasonable duties. There is error in the judgment of the court below and the same is reversed. » Reversed.