Leonard v. . Davis

Stacy, J. Tbe third assignment of error is as follows: “This objection is based upon tbe court’s refusal to admit evidence competent and relevant to tbe suit (E., p. 17).” And there are several other assignments of error of exactly tbe same tenor. We are precluded from considering these exceptions as they do not comply with tbe rules of practice prescribed for tbe presentation of exceptions on appeal. Byrd v. Southerland, 186 N. C., 384. Eules are of no value unless they are to be observed uniformly and without exception, in tbe absence of some valid reason therefor. Lee v. Baird, 146 N. C., 361. On tbe cross-examination of plaintiff, who was a witness in bis own behalf, defendants sought to impeach bis testimony by showing that be bad left, tbe State in 1914, as a fugitive from justice; and for this reason be bad only recently returned to Franklin County. Plaintiff contended that be bad never left tbe State permanently, but bad been in tbe army continuously since 1914, and that when be was discharged in 1920 be was given transportation to bis home in North Carolina. In corroboration of this testimony, plaintiff was allowed to offer in evidence, over objection of defendants, bis certificate showing an honorable discharge from tbe army. Tbe first reference to tbe certificate of *473 discharge was made by defendants in their cross-examination, and it was not introduced in evidence until after the plaintiff ,had been charged with being a fugitive from justice. It showed the date of his enlistment, place of his residence, and other incidents of his continuous service until his honorable discharge, and concluded with the statement that he was entitled to transportation to his home in North Carolina. For these purposes of corroboration it was clearly competent; and if defendants wished to have its introduction thus restricted they should have asked for it at the time of its admission. Rule 21, 185 N. C., 795. Nance v. Tel. Co., 177 N. C., 315; S. v. McGlammery, 173 N. C., 750. The case of Stanley v. Lumber Co., 184 N. C., 302, is clearly distinguishable from the one at bar. There the plaintiff undertook to show by his certificate of discharge, in an action to recover damages for a personal injury, that he was in good physical condition when released from the army. These statements were made and certified by third parties, not witnesses at the trial, and were offered as substantive evidence. The record presents no reversible error, and the judgment entered below will be upheld. No error.