Brown v. . Ruffin

Connor, J. The execution of the contract or option, as alleged in the complaint, is admitted in the answer. It is not denied that plaintiff demanded of the defendants a deed for the ten acres of land, described in the contract, in accordance with its terms. Nor is it denied by the plaintiff that defendants tendered to- him, in accordance with such demand, a deed for the said land, executed by J. F. 'Whedbee and wife, and by the defendants. Plaintiff contended that this deed did not convey to him a good, merchantable title to said land, for the reason that said ten acres of land was a part of and was included within the boundaries of a larger tract of land, which was encumbered by a mortgage and deed of trust executed by J. E. Whedbee and wife, securing notes then unpaid and outstanding. Defendants admit the truth of this contention of plaintiff. *266 In their- answer, however, defendants allege that the notes secured by the mortgage and deed of trust were owned and controlled by plaintiff at the date of the contract, and also on the day the deed was tendered to him. They further allege that at the execution of the contract it was agreed by and between plaintiff and defendants that instead of paying the purchase price of the land in cash, plaintiff would credit the same upon his notes; that at the date the deed was tendered to plaintiff, defendants were ready, able and willing to comply with this agreement, and that plaintiff refused to accept the deed and credit the purchase price of the land in accordance with this agreement, thus releasing the ten acres from the mortgage and deed of trust. This allegation was denied by plaintiff in his reply. An issue was thus raised by the new matter in the answer, controverted by the reply; C. S., 582, subsec. 2. The issue thus raised is material to the defense relied upon by defendants to plaintiff’s cause of action. Indeed, it was vital, for it involves the sole defense set up by defendants in the pleadings to the right of plaintiff to recover in this action. ’There was error in refusing to submit the issue tendered by defendants, or at least an issue involving the matters relied upon by the defendants, and alleged in their answer. “A cause of action or defense should not be tried upon the issue of damages merely, where objection is made, but a separate issue should be submitted and the issue as to damages left to embrace that subject alone.” Carter v. McGill, 168 N. C., 507. The failure to submit the issue tendered by defendants, or an issue involving the matters relied upon by defendants in defense of plaintiff’s cause of action, did not afford defendants opportunity to present these matters to the jury. “When a material defense is pleaded, it is proper for the court to submit an issue on it.” Owens v. Phelps, 95 N. C., 286. The deed executed by J. E. Whedbee and wife and the defendants was sufficient to convey to plaintiff a good title to the land, subject only to the encumbrances held by plaintiff. The contract made by J. E. Whedbee and wife, and M. L. Whedbee provided that upon payment by M. L. Whedbee, his heirs or assigns of the purchase price for the lands described therein on or before 1 January, 1921, J. E. Whedbee and wife would convey said lands, which included the ten acres, to said M. L. Whedbee, his heirs or assigns. By its express terms, the contract was to be null and void, if M. L. Whedbee, his heirs or assigns failed to demand deed and pay the purchase price before 1 January, 1921. M. L. Whedbee’s rights under this contract had expired on 2 January, 1921, and it is immaterial that his assignment of his rights under the contract to defendants was not recorded. It is also immaterial whether *267 the extension of the contract to 1 January, 1922, was valid or not. J. E. Whedbee, the owner of the land, signed the deed and his wife joined him. If the assignment to defendants by M. L. Whedbee, and the extension by J. E. Whedbee and wife, were valid, and defendants had an equity in the land, it was not necessary, in order to pass a good title to the land that their wives sign the deed. Power Corp. v. Power Co., 168 N. C., 219. The only valid objection to the deed tendered plaintiff, was that the land was encumbered by a mortgage and deed of trust, securing claims owned and controlled by plaintiff. Plaintiff could not avail himself of this objection, as a justification for refusing to accept the deed as tendered, if he had agreed to credit the notes owned by him, and secured by the mortgage and deed of trust with the purchase price of the ten acres, and defendants were willing, when they tendered the deed, that the purchase price should be so credited by the plaintiff. There is no law requiring that such an agreement on the part of plaintiff, with respect to the application of the purchase money, and the release of the land from the mortgage and deed of trust, should be in writing. There was evidence tending to establish the agreement as alleged by defendants in their answer, and the refusal of the court to give the instruction requested by defendants was error. See Stevens v. Turlington, 186 N. C., 191. There must be a new trial. An appropriate issue, involving the matters alleged in the answer in defense of plaintiffs cause of action must be submitted the jury. If competent evidence, tending to establish the truth of the allegation is offered, the jury should be instructed by the court upon the law arising thereon. New trial.