Petit v. . Woodlief

Avery, J.: The defendant enclosed in a letter a draft to the plaintiff for $300, setting forth upon its face that it was to operate as a payment in full of a claim for repairing an engine. The defendant contended that only $250 was in fact due, but stated in his letter that he had concluded to send $300. The letter and draft construed together constituted a proposal of compromise, and even though in reality a larger sum was due, as the jury found, if the offer was accepted, either expressly or by implication arising from the defendant’s conduct, there was not simply a valid executory agreement, but an executed contract, as in that event the payment operated to discharge the whole claim. The defendant Woodlief not only stated in his letter that the draft for $300 was enclosed “ to settle with you (plaintiff) in full to date,” but, according to the undisputed testimony, the same words, or the equivalent expression, “ settlement in full to date,” were incorporated in the draft itself, which was drawn on Strudwick & Royster, and was afterwards destroyed by fire. When the plaintiff endorsed this draft and collected the money, with the proposal staring him in the face that it should, if received, operate to discharge the whole debt, instead of returning it to the drawer and declining the offer, we think that his conduct amounted to an acceptance of it, *126 and the debt was therefore discharged in full. Our statuté (The Code, § 575) having been declared constitutional, the offer of a part in satisfaction of the whole, if accepted, discharges a debt as fully and effectually as if the entire sum originally due is paid in full. When the amount due is uncertain or unliquidated, if an offer in satisfaction of the claim is accompanied with such acts and declarations as amount to a condition that the money shall be accepted only as a payment in full of the claim, and the party to whom the offer is made must of necessity understand, from its very terms, that if he takes the money he takes it subject to such condition, then, in law, the payment operates to discharge the whole claim. Preston v. Grant, 34 Vt., 201; Townslee v. Healee, 39 Vt., 522; Boston Rubber Co. v. Peerless Co., etc., 58 Vt., 553. Under the construction placed upon our statute the offer of a less sum than is due, when the amount of the debt is certain, is in effect the same as the offer of a given sum in satisfaction of a contingent or unliquidated claim. We cannot rely as authority, therefore, upon the earlier cases decided by the Court, or upon the authorities in other States, where the principle still prevails that an agreement to accept a payment of a part of an unconditional claim for a sum certain in satisfaction of the whole is, unless there is an actual release, but a nudum pactum. We must, therefore, be governed by the rule adopted in reference to offers to settle contingent claims, because they are analogous to proposals of compromise of indebtedness under our statute. The plaintiff knew, from the face of the draft, that the defendant intended it to be accepted upon condition that it should discharge the debt, and that the draft itself should be in the nature of a receipt or voucher for the full payment. With that knowledge he chose to use the draft and take his chances to collect more. We think the question of intent was no more an open one for the jury to determine upon the testimony than would be the question of acceptance where the, drawee writes the *127 word “ Accepted ” on the back of a bill of exchange and signs his name under it. There is no difference in principle between the case at bar and that of Boykin v. Buie, 107 N. C., 501. There the creditor agreed by letter to accept an offer from the debtor of a part in discharge of his whole debt, but when the latter forwarded a check in compliance with the agreement entered the amount paid as a credit. In our case the defendant sent a draft and a letter, both expressing the condition upon which the draft was to be accepted. The terms of the proposition being unmistakable, we think that the acceptance of the money was an implied assent to the proposal, the legal effect of which was to discharge the whole debt. We are of opinion, therefore, that in the refusal to give the instruction that the claim was satisfied, there was error, for which we must grant a new trial. New Trial.