Harrison v. . Guilford County

"WiNBORNE, J. Tbe question bere is tbis: Does tbe property, wbicb is tbe subject of tbis controversy, come witbin tbe definition of real property wbicb is exempt from taxation under tbe statute in effect 1 January, 1940, Public Laws 1939, cb. 310, sec. 600 (3) ? Tbe effect of tbe ruling of tbe court below is tbat it does come witbin tbe meaning of tbe statute. Our opinion is accordant witb tbat view. While in Article Y, section 3, of tbe Constitution of North Carolina, it is required tbat tbe power of taxation shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner, and shall not be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away, and tbat taxes on property shall be uniform as to each class of property, it is provided in section 5 of Article Y tbat “Tbe General Assembly may exempt cemeteries and property held for educational, scientific, literary, charitable or religious purposes . . .” Tbe General Assembly has provided in section 600 of cb. 310 of Public Laws of 1939 tbat “Tbe following real property, and no other, shall be exempted from taxation . . . (3) Buildings, witb tbe land upon wbicb they are situated, lawfully owned and held by churches or religious bodies, wholly and exclusively used for religious worship or for tbe residence of tbe minister of any such church or religious body together witb tbe addition adjacent land reasonably necessary for tbe convenient use of any such building . . .” Upon tbe agreed facts tbe lot, wbicb is tbe subject of tbis controversy, is, in good faith, held for, dedicated to and used for church purposes. It, therefore, comes witbin tbe class of property held for religious purposes wbicb tbe General Assembly may exempt. Tbe question then arises: Has tbe General Assembly exempted it ? Statutes exempting specific property from taxation because of tbe purposes for wbicb such property is held and used, are and should be construed strictly, when there is room for construction, against exemption and in favor of taxation. United Brethren v. Comrs., 115 N. C., 489, 20 S. E., 626; Trustees v. Avery County, 184 N. C., 469, 114 S. E., 696; Hospital v. Rowan County, 205 N. C., 8, 169 S. E., 805; Odd Fellows v. Swain, 217 N. C., 632, 9 S. E. (2d), 365; Hospital v. Guilford County, ante, 673. *722 “By tbe rule of strict construction, however, is not meant that tbe statute shall be stintingly or even narrowly construed, . . . but it means that everything shall be excluded from its operation which does not clearly come within the scope of the language used . . .” Stacy, C. J., in S. v. Whitehurst, 212 N. C., 300, 193 S. E., 657. The words used in the statute must be given their natural or ordinary meaning. 71 C. J., 353; Borders v. Cline, 212 N. C., 472, 193 S. E., 826. Applying these rules, we are of opinion and hold the clause in subsection 3 of section 600, which reads: “together with the addition adjacent land reasonably necessary for the convenient use of any such building” is sufficiently clear and broad enough to include the lot of land which is the subject of this controversy. What is meant by adjacent land? Webster, in defining the word “adjacent,” says: “Objects are adjacent when they lie close to each other, but not necessarily in actual contact; as adjacent fields, villages.” When given this ordinary meaning, adjacent land which is reasonably necessary for the convenient use of the building wholly and exclusively for religious purposes must lie close to, but not necessarily in contact with the land on which the building is situated. The lot in question is stated to be four or five blocks away, but other adjoining lands were not available. The agreed facts show that the lot is reasonably necessary for the convenient use of the church, and is wholly and exclusively used for religious worship. The judgment below is Affirmed.