Chamberlain v. . Trogden

IIokb, J., after stating the facts: There is some conflict of authority as to the right of a subscriber to rescind his subscription or maintain a defense to his obligation therefor on the ground of fraud, after the corporation has become insolvent and its affairs have passed into the possession and control of a receiver or the bankruptcy court, or other method of general adjustment, primarily for the benefit of creditors. The English cases and some courts in this country have held that, under conditions indicated, it is no longer open to the subscriber to maintain such a defense. These English decisions, *141 however, are said to be based to some extent on the construction given to certain legislation on the subject, and the weight of authority in this country seems to establish that, under exceptional circumstances, the subscriber may avail himself of the position suggested even aftei* insolvency. Cook on Corporations, secs. 163, 164, 165; Clark and Marshall Private Corp., secs. 413-479; Ramsay v. Manufacturing Co., 116 Mo., 313; Martin v. Land Co., 94 Va., 51-53; Havard, Receiver, v. Turner, 155 Pa. St., 349. All of the authorities, however, are to the effect that, in order to do so, the subscriber must act with promptness and due diligence, both in ascertaining the fraud and taking steps to repudiate his obligation. Thompson v. Savings Bank, 19 Nev., 103; 3 Amer. St. Reports, note on p. 824; Clark and another v. Thomas, Receiver, 34 Ohio St., 46; Wallace v. Hood, 89 Eed. Rep., p. 11; Wallace v. Bacon, 86 Fed. Rep., p. 553; Ross-Mebern-Brooke Co. v. Southern Iron Co., 72 Fed., 957. And this question of proper diligence is usually one for the jury. Urner v. Sollenberger, 89 Md., 316. In the present action the defendant has had the full benefit of this established principle, and, under a correct charge, the jury in their answer to the fourth issue have determined the question against him. The only objection insisted on to the validity of this recovery is that the Judge below declined to charge the jury “that on the whole evidence, if believed, the jury should answer the fourth issue for the defendant,” but the exception is without merit. While the time during which the defendant was under this obligation was not of any great-length, it appeared that defendant was fifty-three years of age, a banker and a man of affairs, and he knew when he made the subscription that the company had given indications of weakness and had for a time been in the hands of a receiver. He was resident in the vicinity, and by slight effort and the exercise of ordinary business prudence could have easily ascertained the condition of affairs. ITe knew the secretary and *142 treasurer, and a cursory examination of tbe books would bave disclosed that, of $25,000 worth of stock issued, only $4,300 bad been paid in. A large amount of tbe company’s indebtedness was evidenced by mortgages on tbe company’s real estate, duly registered in tbe county. All tbis was open to bim, or could bave been readily ascertained, and defendant not only took no steps to inform bimself and make complaint as to tbe alleged imposition, but there was testimony to tbe effect that, as late as August, when told that tbe company was wholly insolvent and tbe only chance for it was a reorganization, and that unless as much as $10,000 was raised tbe company would likely bave to go into bankruptcy, tbe defendant declined to give a proxy to vote bis stock, but said be intended to keep his stock and vote it bimself if occasion arose. There was assuredly no error to defendant’s prejudice in submitting tbe question of bis laches to tbe jury, and tbe verdict and judgment against bim must be affirmed. No Error.