Miller v. . Caudle

Clarkson, J. The only question involved in this controversy is whether or not the Workmen’s Compensation Insurance Policy issued by the defendant carrier, the American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, of Boston, Mass., covered and included the deceased employee, Frank Miller, a blacksmith, at the time of his injury by accident and death on 29 August, 1940? We think the employee, Frank Miller, deceased, was covered by the Compensation Insurance policy. This is an action brought by plaintiff, widow of Frank Miller, deceased, under the N. C. Workmen’s Compensation Act, in which she seeks compensation for the death of her husband for “injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.” N. C. Code, 1939 (Michie), part section 8081 (f). The hearing Commissioner set forth, which was confirmed by the Full Commission: “Finds as a fact that plaintiff’s deceased sustained an injury by accident on August 29, 1940, which arose out of and in the course of his employment; that death resulted from said injury by accident on the same date.” It is admitted that the American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, one of the defendants, issued to A. Clarence Caudle, trading as Caudle Trucking Company, the other defendant, a standard Workmen’s Compensation Policy, covering the period from 9 March, 1940, to 9 March, 1941. The premium of $323.40 was paid on the policy. The injury by accident causing the death of Frank Miller, occurred on 29 August, 1940, during the life of the policy. The controversy between the parties narrows itself down mainly to one question: Did the insurance policy include the deceased employee, a blacksmith? The plaintiff contends that it did; the defendant Caudle, trading as Caudle Trucking Company, contends that it did. The defend *315 ant, American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, contends it did not. Tbe Industrial Commission found that it did. Was there sufficient competent evidence to sustain this finding ? In tbe policy declaration is tbe following: “Locations of all factories, shops, yards, buildings, premises, or other work places of this employer, by Town or City, with Street and Number: 3020 Hillsboro St., Wake County, Ealeigb, N. C., and- elsewhere in the State of North Carolina (Italics ours.)- Then is set forth those who are covered by the policy: “Truckmen, N. O. C. — including Drivers, Chauffeurs and their Helpers; Stablemen; Garagemen; Blacksmiths; Eepairmen; Eiggers. — (Storage Warehouse employees to be separately rated.)” The Industrial Commission found: “The evidence further discloses that the said Caudle was engaged in the trucking business, hauling sand and gravel and owned or operated approximately 14 trucks in this business ; that to supply the demand of his customers he rented or leased the rights of several streams as a source of supply for sand and gravel; that subsequent to the purchase of the compensation policy in question said Caudle purchased or leased a quarry to further supply the demand for gravel; that one truck was kept in the quarry at all times, and at times he used four or five trucks in the quarry in hauling out the gravel. It appears from the evidence that the deceased worked as a blacksmith, one of the classifications listed in the policy, both in repairing the truck equipment and that of the quarry. There is no evidence of the defendant employer employing any other blacksmith than the deceased. . . .” The Industrial Commission found the further facts: “1. That the deceased was employed as a blacksmith, which is one of the classifications covered by the compensation policy of the defendant carrier, American Mutual Liability Insurance Company. “2. That the operation of the quarry was incident and appurtenant to the regular business of A. Clarence Caudle, trading as Caudle Trucking-Company, in carrying on his trucking business, which included the operation of a steam shovel, renting of branches by the month, hauling stone, unloading steel, cement, and contract hauling 'under a shovel.’ “3. That the defendant employer maintained one truck in the quarry at all times and often as many as four or five trucks would be used in the quarry in hauling out gravel. ■ “4. That the blacksmith was required to repair the picks, mattocks, shovels, pitchforks, and other tools used in the regular course of the defendant employer’s business.” The declaration says: “Or other work places of this employer,” and states “3020 Hillsboro Street, Ealeigh, N. C., and elsewhere in the State of North Carolina.” The Industrial Commission found “That the oper *316 ation of the quarry was incident and appurtenant to the regular business” of defendant Caudle. There are other findings of fact by the Industrial Commission not necessary to be repeated to sustain the award. It is contended by defendant Insurance Company that the quarry operation was subsequent to the issuing of the Insurance Policy, and a higher rate of premium exists for quarry coverage, and that on the entire record the policy did not cover the quarry operation and the judgment should be rendered dismissing the award. We cannot so hold, from the findings of fact of the Commission before set forth. In A. Clarence Caudle’s testimony is the following: “Q. In your policy you classified truck driving, repairmen, helpers, garagemen, and blacksmiths? Ans.: Yes, sir. Q. Now, what kind of business were you engaged in at the time you took this policy out? Ans.: Well, my business has been, as I tried to explain it to Mr. Heston (agent for the Insurance Company) at the time that I bought this policy, consists of contract hauling. Probably I’ll put three or four trucks under a shovel, or I’ll — ■ Q. Under the shovel, explain that ? A. I mean a steam shovel. Then I rent branches by the month; I have about three or four that consist of hauling stone, unloading steel, cement, I explained to him at the time I taken my policy out; they tell me that I am covered. A. Consists of hauling stone, branch gravel, sand, unloading steel, cement, limestone, contract hauling under a shoveling; I presume that is about all it covered. Q. Was the deceased a blacksmith? Ans.: Yes, sir, we have to have a blacksmith. We have picks, mattocks, shovels, pitchforks, all in our line of work. Q. Did he work on the tools in your regular line of work ? Ans.: Yes, sir. Q. Did he work on tools not connected specifically to your pit or quarry, as they call it ? Ans.: Sharpened any kind of tools which we might have which consisted of shovels, picks, and mattocks, and also steel; that is about all the work we did have for a blacksmith.” In Blassingame v. Asbestos Co., 217 N. C., 223 (233), it is written: “In Johnson v. Hosiery Co., 199 N. C., 38 (40), this Court said: ‘It is generally held by the courts that the various Compensation Acts of the Union should be liberally construed to the end that the benefits thereof should not be denied upon technical, narrow, and strict interpretation.’ We see nothing prejudicial to defendants. In II Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Law (2d Ed.), part sec. 554, at pp. 2002-3, we find: ‘Courts may not interfere with the findings of fact, made by the Industrial Commission, when these are supported by evidence, even though it may be thought there be error.’ ‘The rule ... is well settled to the effect that, if in any reasonable view of the evidence it will support, either directly or indirectly, or by fair inference, the findings made by the Commission, then they m.ust be regarded as conclusive’ *317 (citing a wealth of authorities). Courts cannot demand the same precision in the finding of Commission as otherwise might be if the members were required to be learned in the law.” Graham v. Wall, ante, 84 (88). In Bray v. Ins. Co., 139 N. C., 390 (393), Walker, J., for the Court, said: “If the clause in question is ambiguously worded, so that there is any uncertainty as to its right interpretation, or if for any reason there is doubt in our minds concerning its true meaning, we should construe it rather against the defendant, who was its author, than against the plaintiffs, and any such doubt should be resolved in favor of the latter, giving, of course, legal effect to the intention, if it can he ascertained, although it may have been imperfectly or obscurely expressed. Grabbs v. Ins. Co., 125 N. C., 389.” The Insurance Company cites provisions of the policy, to sustain its contention, as follows: “All business operations, including the operative management and superintendence thereof, conducted at or from the locations and premises defined above as declared in each instance by a disclosure of estimated remuneration of employees under such of the following divisions as are undertaken by this Employer. 1. All industrial operations upon the premises. 2. All office forces. 3. All repairs or alterations to premises. 4. Specially rated operations on the premises. 5. Operations not on the premises.” It will be noted that this says “Operations not on the premises.” “The foregoing enumeration and description of employees includes all persons employed in the service of this employer in connection with the business operations above described to whom remuneration of any nature in consideration of service is paid.” “VI. This agreement shall apply to such injuries so sustained by reason of the business operations described in said declarations which, for the purpose of this insurance, shall include all operations necessary, incident, or appurtenant thereto, or connected therewith, whether such operations are conducted at the work places defined and described in said declarations or elsewhere in connection with, or in relation to, such work places.” It will be noted that this does not confine the “work places.” It says “or elsewhere in connection with or in relation to, such work places.” Construing these and the previous provisions of the policy as before recited, we do not think that a fair and reasonable construction of the entire policy would justify the contention of defendant Insurance Company. If the language of the policy is not clear, but ambiguous, and there is uncertainty as to its right interpretation, the doubt is resolved against the Insurance Company. . We think the cases cited by the Insurance Company, Burnett v. Paint Co., 216 N. C., 204, and Paulson v. Industrial Accident Commission *318 (Cal.), 112 Pa., 108, 2m 710, distinguishable from the present action, in the light of the language of the insurance policy and the facts found by the Industrial Commission. We here are not a fact-finding body, as we have said before. If we were, we might sometimes reach a different conclusion. If there is any competent evidence to support the findings of fact made by the Industrial Commission, we are bound by those findings. The findings of fact of the Industrial Commission contain also other reasons other than what we have set forth, why the award should be sustained. Under section 60 of the Compensation Act, the award of the Commission is “conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact.” Chambers v. Oil Co., 199 N. C., 28 (32). We think this casé is governed by Kenan v. Motor Co., 203 N. C., 108. The able argument and brief of defendant Insurance Company is persuasive but not convincing. For the reasons given, the judgment of the court below is Affirmed.