Merrimon v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co.

*105 OoNnob, J. In apt time, tbe defendant requested tbe judge of tbe general county court, in writing, to instruct tbe jury as follows: “I charge you, gentlemen of tbe jury, that tbe release offered by tbe defendant is a bar to tbe action of tbe plaintiff, and it will be your duty to answer tbe fourth issue ‘Yes.’ ” This prayer was refused, and on defendant’s appeal to tbe Superior Court, its assignments of error based on such refusal was overruled. In this there was error, and for this error tbe judgment of tbe Superior Court affirming tbe judgment of tbe general county court must be reversed. At tbe trial in tbe general county court, tbe plaintiff admitted tbe execution by her of tbe release as alleged in tbe answer of tbe defendant. She did not allege in her reply or offer evidence at tbe trial tending to show that tbe execution of tbe release was procured by fraud, or that there was any mistake with respect to its contents. Tbe validity of tbe release was not challenged by tbe plaintiff. Tbe release is therefore binding and conclusive on tbe plaintiff. Its language is plain and unequivocal, and clearly shows tbe intention of tbe parties. Tbe cause of action, if any, alleged in tbe complaint in this action existed to tbe knowledge of tbe plaintiff at tbe time she signed tbe release. For a consideration which was satisfactory to her tbe plaintiff released and discharged tbe defendant from any and all liability to her not only on tbe cause of action alleged in tbe complaint in tbe action then pending in tbe general county court of Buncombe County, but also on any claim or claims which she then bad against tbe defendant. She executed tbe release, which was drawn by her attorney, after consultation with him, and after full consideration of its contents. When she executed tbe release, and delivered it to tbe defendant, she knew all tbe facts which she alleges as her cause of action in tbe complaint in this action. She is and ought to be bound by tbe terms and provisions of her contract, which are sufficiently broad and comprehensive to include tbe claim against tbe defendant on which her cause of action alleged in tbe complaint in this action is founded. Jeffreys v. R. R., 127 N. C., 377, 37 S. E., 515, is readily distinguishable from tbe instant case. Tbe decision in that case does not sustain tbe contention of tbe plaintiff that tbe release in tbe instant case is not effective to bar a recovery by her on tbe cause of action alleged in tbe complaint in this action. This will appear from a comparison of tbe release in that case with tbe release in tbe instant case. Tbe distinction is apparent, and recognizes tbe principle stated in Houston v. Trower, 297 Fed., 558, as follows: “Tbe language in a release may be broad enough to cover all demands and rights to demand or possible causes of action, a complete discharge *106 of liability from one to another, whether or not the various demands or claims have been discussed or mentioned, and whether or not the possible claims are all known. One seeking a settlement and release has the right to buy peace from all future contention on then existing claims of every character.” As the release executed by the plaintiff is a bar to her recovery in this action, we do not decide or discuss the many interesting questions presented by other assignments of error relied on by defendant in this appeal. The action is remanded to the Superior Court of Buncombe County with direction that judgment be entered in accordance with this opinion. Reversed. ScheNcic, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.