Standard Supply Co. v. Finch & Person

IíoKE, J., after stating the case: The Court does not take the view of this evidence which seems to have impressed the trial Judge. The account for these goods being originally an obligation of Finch & Person, and for which that firm still remains liable, any obligation of defendant J. E. Person, as guarantor, must be evidenced and established by written agreement or some written note or memorandum of same signed by him or some person duly authorized to sign for him. Revisal, sec. 974; Jenkins v. Holly, 140 N. C., 379; Shepherd v. Newton, 139 N. C., 533. The plaintiff recognizes this as the law governing the case, and claims to have met this requirement by reason of certain written correspondence put in evidence, as follows: *108 “Piiceville, N. C., May 3, 1906. “STANDARD SuPPLY COMPANY, Wilmington, N. 0. “GeNtlemen : — Yours of May 1st to band. I pay out the money Eincb & Person bave in my bands as they direct. Tbat is, all their drafts and checks are sent to the bank at Eremont and placed to my credit, and from tbat .amount I pay out as they direct. So, if they draw a draft on me and do not bave money enough to their credit to pay it, I do not pay until they do bave. This is an arrangement of recent dato. I bave up to recently been paying their bills, regardless of whether they bad.anything to their credit or not. I find tbat, in order to make them more strict with their business, the responsibility of it must rest on their own 'shoulders from now on. With this explanation I trust my refusal to accept draft will be satisfactory to you. “Respectfully, etc., “I. E. Person.” “Dr. J. E. Peeson, “May 4, 1906. Piiceville, N. G. “Dear Sir: — Our extension of credit to Pinch & Person has been on the basis of a letter received from you, in which you stated that you 'were supporting this firm with your finances. We have depended entirely upon your responsibility in making accounts with them, knowing that you are perfectly responsible for any amounts which they would probably make in their joint interest. We shall have to ask of you to reconsider your determination not to accept a paper from these parties, as we know nothing of their responsibility and should not have credited them to the extent we have unless we had felt authorized so to do from your letters. We would be glad to have you say whether you will accept a paper from them to sign and forward you, and which we are perfectly *109 willing to make, on tbe basis of one-balf and three months, if you so desire, or whether you are unwilling to do this. “Yours very truly, “STANDARD SuPPLY COMPANY.” “Magnolia, N. O., May 10, .1906. “Standard Supply Company, Wilmington, N. O. “Gentlemen:- — -Your letter of May 4th has been received. I am here at the mill of Einch & Person to see what progress they are making with their work. I find that the dry kiln is not completed, and when it is, which will be soon, I think you will get your money sooner than to sign a paper or papers for the time mentioned in your letter. Just as soon as the dry kiln gets in operation I will see that your bill is paid. “Respectfully, etc., “J. E. Person.” “Dr. J. E. Person, “May 11, 1906. Fremont, N. G. “Dear Sir: — Your letter of May 10th is before us, and entirely satisfactory.' We presumed that the proposition to make a paper would probably be a greater accommodation to Messrs. Einch & Person than to wait on them for an early settlement; but it would appear from your letter that your preference, which we presume is also theirs, is to have this paid in the ordinary way and after a short period. Thanking you for your kindness in this matter, we are, “Yours very truly, “Standard Supply Company.” And plaintiff testified that the latter portion of the goods,. to-wit, the sum of $451.75, being the amount for which recovery was had against J. E. Person, was sold on the faith of these letters, more particularly that of 10 May. But the Court is of opinion that there is nothing in this letter, or in any other portion of the correspondence, which, *110 in express terms or by fair intendment, gives indication that the defendant J. E. Person guaranteed future sales, or that his letter was intended to be a continuing guaranty. On the contrary, this correspondence, by plain import, refers only to an account already made. The defendant’s first communication, which appears in evidence, declined to pay the bill presented at all or to accept a draft for the amount, stating his rule to be that he only paid after the debtor firm had placed funds to the amount to the writer’s credit in the bank at Fremont. Plaintiff then proposed that defendant accept a paper on the “basis of one-half and three months,” when defendant replied, saying that he would pay their bill as soon as the dry kiln got in operation. This is the promise relied upon, and in terms it'refers to an account stated. The defendant is not responsible for the former portion of the account, for the lack of any valuable consideration for his promise (Green v. Thornton, 49 N. C., 230); nor for the latter portion, because, in our opinion, the written correspondence, relied upon for the purpose, contains no evidence of a continuing guaranty, but, by fair implication, refers to an account already made. It has long been the policy and express provision of our statute law that obligations of this character shall be in writing, and, however meritorious in a given instance we may consider a claim to be, we are not at liberty to disregard the plain requirement of the statute. The case on appeal was made up by agreement of counsel, and we have expressed our opinion on the questions presented by the exceptions as they now appear, and which show that J. E. Person was held responsible for the goods sold after the letter of 10 May. There is some indication in the record and the testimony, not sufficiently definite, however, to justify the Court in acting on it, that by inadvertence counsel may have erroneously stated the rulings of the trial Judge as to the portion of the account which, under the charge, was established *111 as a valid claim against defendant J. E. Person. As tbe canse goes back, any mistake of tliat kind wliieb may have operated to plaintiff’s prejudice can be corrected on tbe new bearing, and it is not desirable at tbis time to make further statement-concerning it. Eor tbe cause indicated, tbe defendant is entitled to a new trial, and it is so ordered. New Trial.